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FOREWORD 
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey 
was establis.hed by the Secretary of War on 3 No-
vember 1944, pursuant to a directive from the late 
President Roosevelt. Its mission ' 'as to conduct 
an impartial and expert study of the effects of our 
aerial attack on Germany, to be used in connection 
with air attacks on Japan and to establish a basis 
for enluating the importance and potentialities 
of air po,ver as an instrument of military strategy, 
for planning the future development of the United 
States armed forces, and for determining future 
economic policies with respect to the national de-
fense. A summary report and some 200 supporting 
reports containing the findings of the Survey in 
Germany ha...-e been published. 
On 15 August 1945, President Truman requested 
that the Suney conduct a similar study of the 
effects of all types of air attack in the war against 
Japan, submitting reports in duplicate to the Sec-
retary of \Var and to the Secretary of the Navy. 
The officers of the Survey during its Japanese 
phase were: 
Frft"nklin D'Olier, Cl;lairman. 
I 
Paul H. Nitze, Henry C. Alexander, Vice 
Chairmen. 
Walter Wilds, Secretary. 
Harry L. Bo"-man. 
J. K. Galbraith. 
Rensis Likert. 
Frank A. MeN amee. 
Fred .Searls, Jr. 
Monroe Spaght. 
Dr. Louis R. Thompson. 
. Theodore P. Wright, Directors. 
The Sun-ey's complement provided for 300 civil-
III 
ians, 350 officers, and 500 enlisted men. The mili-
tary segment of the organization was drawn from 
the Army to the extent of 60 percent, and from the 
Navy to the extent of 40 percent. Both the Army 
and Navy gaYe the Survey all possible assistance 
in furnishing men, supplies, transport, and infor-
mation. The Survey operated from headquarters 
in Tokyo eady in September 1945, with subhead-
quarters in Nagoya, Osaka, Hiroshima, and N aga-
saki, and with mobile teams operating in other 
parts of Japan, the islands of the Pacific and the 
Asiatic mainland. 
It was possible to reconstruct much of wartime 
Japanese military planning and execution, en-
gagement by engagement and campaign by cam-
paign, and to secure reasonably accurate statistics 
on Japan's economy and war production, plant by 
plant and industry by industry. In addition, 
studies were conducted on Japan's over-all strategic 
plans and the background of her entry into the 
war, the internal discussions and negotiations 
leading to her acceptance of unconditional su L'-
render, the course of health and morale among the 
civilian population, the effectiveness of the J apa-
nese civilian defense organization and the effects 
of the atomic bombs. Separate reports will be 
issued covering each phase of the study. 
The Survey interrogated more than 700 Jap:t-
nese military, gonrnment, and industrial officials. 
It also recovered and translated many documents 
which have not only been useful to the Survey, but 
" -ill also furnish data valuable for other studies. 
Arrangements are being made to turn over the 
Survey's files to a permanent Government agency 
where they will be available for further examina-
tion and distribution. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The available facts about the po"·er of the 
atomic bomb as a military weapon lie in the 
story of what it did at H iroshima and Nagasaki. 
Many of these facts l~ave been published, in 
official and unofficial form, but mingled with dis-
tortions or errors. The United States Strategic 
Bombing Survey, therefore, in partial fulfillment 
of the mission for which it was established, has 
put together in these pages a fairly full account of 
just "·hat the atomic bombs did at Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. Together with an explanation of how 
the bomb achieved these effects, this report states 
the extent and nature of the damage, the casualties, 
and the political repercussions from the two at-
tacks. The basis is the observation, measurement, 
and analysis of the Survey's investigators. The 
conjecture that is necessary for understanding of 
complex phenomena and for applying the findings 
to the problems of defense of the United States is 
clearly labelled. 
When the atomic bombs fell, the United States 
Strategic Bombing Smvey was completing a study 
of the effects of strategic bombing on Germany's 
ability and will to resist. A similar study of the 
effects of strategic bombing on Japan was being 
planned. The ne\YS of the dropping of the atomic 
bomb gave a ne"· urgency to this project, for a 
study of the air "·ar against Japan clearly involved 
nmY weapons and new possibilities of concentra-
tion of attack that might qua1ify or even change 
the conclusions and recommendations of the Sur-
vey as to the effectiveness of air power. The di-
rectors of the SurYey, therefore, decided to exam-
1 
ine exhaustively the effects of the atomic bombs, 
in order that the full impact on Japan and the 
implications of their results could be confidently 
analyzed. Teams of experts were selected to study 
the scenes of the bombings from the special points 
of emphasis of physical damage, civilian defense, 
morale, casualties, community life, utilities and 
transportation, various industries, and the general 
economic and political repercussions. In all, more 
than 110 men-engineers, architects, fire experts, 
economists, doctors, photographers, draftsmen-
participated in the field study at each city, over a 
period of 10 weeks from October to December, 
1945. Their detailed studies are now being pub-
lished. 
In addition, close liaison was maintained with 
other investigating units. Cooperation was re-
ceived from, and extended to, the following 
groups : 
The Joint Commission for the Investigation 
of the Atomic Bomb in Japan. 
The British Mission to Japan. 
The Naval Technical Mission to Japan. 
Special acknowledgment is due to the medical 
groups of the Joint Commission, whose data and 
findings have been generously made available to 
the Survey. On medical aspects of the bombings, 
the Joint Commission was the chief fact-finding 
group; it will present its definitive report in the 
near future. In other fields, however-particu-
larly the study of physical damage and the impact 
on community life-the Survey collected its own 
data and is the primary source. 
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II. THE EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS 
A. T HE ATTACKS AND DAMAGE 
1. The attacks._!_A single atomic bomb, the first 
weapon of its type ever used against a target, ex-
ploded over the city of Hiroshima at 0815 on the 
morning of 6 August 1945.) Most of the industrial 
workers had already reported to work, but many 
workers were em·oute and nearly all the school 
children and some industrial employees were at 
work in the open on the program. of building re-
moval to provide firebreaks and disperse valuables 
to the country. The attack came 45 minutes after 
the "all clear" had been sounded from a previous 
alert. Because of the lack of warning and the 
populace's indifference to small groups of planes, 
the explosion came as an almost complete surprise, 
and the people had not taken shelter. Many were 
caught in the open, and most of the rest in flim-
sily constructed homes or commercial establish-
ments. 
L'The bomb exploded slightly northwest of the 
center of the city. Because of this accuracy and 
the flat terrain and circular shape of the city, 
Hiroshima was uniformly and extensively dev-
astated. Practically the entire densely or mod-
erately built-up portion of the city was leveled by 
blast and swept by firJ A "fire-storm," a phe-
nomenon which has occurred infrequently in other 
conflagrations, develo.ped in H iroshima : fires 
springing up almost simultaneously ov~::~;- the wide 
flat area around the center of the city't~fi~ew in air 
from all directions. The inrush of air easily 
overcame the natural ground wind, which had a 
velocity of only about 5 miles per hour. The 
"fire-wind" attained a maximum velocity of 30 to 
40 miles per hour 2 to 3 hours after the explosion. 
The "fire-wind" and the s:Yrnmetry of the built-up 
center of the city gave a roughly circular shape to 
the 4.4 square miles \Yhich were almost completely 
burned out. 
The surprise, the collapse of many buildings: 
and the conflagration contributed to an unprece-
dented casualty rate. Seventy to eighty thousand 
people were killed, or missing and presumed dead, 
3 
and an equal number were injured. The mag-
nitude of casualties is set in relief by a compari-
son with the Tokyo fire raid of 9-10 March 1945, 
in ·which, though nearly 16 square miles were de-
stroyed, the number killed was no larger, and fewer 
people ·were injured. 
At Nagasaki, 3 days later, the city was scarcely. 
more prepared, though vague references to the 
Hiroshima disaster had appeared in the newspaper 
of 8 August. From the Nagasaki Prefectural 
Report on the bombing, something of the shock 
of the explosion can be inferred: 
The day was clear with not very much wind-an or-
dinary midsummer's day. The strain of continuous air 
attack on the city's population and the severity of the 
summer had vitiated enthusiastic air raid precautions. 
Previously, a general a lert had been sounded at 0748, 
with a raid alert at 0750; this was canceled at 0830, and 
the alertness of the people was dissipated by a great feel-
ing of relief. 
The city remained on the warning alert, but 
when two B-29's were again sighted coming in 
the raid signal was not given immediately; the 
bomb was dropped at 1102 and the raid signal was 
given a few minutes later, at 11.09. Thus only 
about ·400 people were in the city's tunnel shelters, 
which were adequate for about 30 percent of the 
population. 
( When the atomic bomb exploded, an intense flash was 
observed first, as though a large amount of magnesium 
had been ignited, and the scene grew hazy with white 
smoke. At the same time at the center of the explosion, 
and a short while later in other areas, a tremendous 
~1>i:rfg sound was heard and a crushing blast wave and 
intense heat were fe(t. The people of Nagasaki, even 
those who ltved on the outer edge vf the blast, all felt as 
though they had sustained a direct hit, and the whole 
city suffered damage such as would have resulted from 
direct hits everywhere by ordinary bombs. -") 
The zero area, where the danlage was most severe, was 
almost completely wiped out and for a short while after 
the explosion no reports came out of that area. People 
who were in comparatiYely damaged areas reported their 
condition under the impression that they had received a 
direct hit. If such a great amount of damage could be 
wreaked by a near miss, then the power of the atomic 
bomb is unbelievably great. 
\ 

In Nagasaki, no fire storm arose, and the un-
even terrain of the city confined the maximum in-
tensity of damage to the valley over which the . 
bomb exploded. The area of nearly complete dev-
astation was thus much smaller; only about 1.8 
square miles. Casualties were lower also; between 
35,000 and 40,000 Y>ere killed, and about the same 
number injured. People in the tunnel shelters 
e'scaped injury, unless exposed in the entrance 
shaft. 
The difference in the totals of destruction to 
lives and property at the two cities suggests the 
importance of the special circumstances of lay-
out and construction of the cities, which affect the 
results of the bombings and must be considered 
in evaluating the effectiveness of the atomic bombs. 
An account of the nature and history of each city 
will give meaning to the details of the damage and 
disorganization at each. 
2. Hiroshima.-The city of Hiroshima is lo-
cated on the broad fan-shaped delta of the Ota 
River, whose 7 mouths divide the city into 6 islands 
Yrhich project fingerlike into Hiroshima Bay of 
the Inland Sea. These mouths of the river fur-
nished excellent firebreaks in a city that is other-
wise fiat and only slightly above sea level. A 
highly developed bridge system, with 81 imP,ortant 
bridges, joined the islands. A single kidney-
shaped hill in the eastern part of the city, about 
one-half mile long and rising to an elevation of 
221 :feet, offered some blast protection to structures 
on the eastern side opposite the point of :fall of 
the bomb. Otherwise, the city was uniformly ex-
posed to the spreading energy from the bomb. 
The city boundary extends to some low hills to 
the "·est and northeast and e~races 26.36 square 
miles, only 13 o:f "·hich were built up. Seven 
square miles were densely or moderately built up, 
the remainder being occupied by sparsely built-up 
residential, storage, and transportation areas, veg-
etable :farms, water courses, and wooded hilly sec-
tions. In the central area, no systematic separa-
tion of commercial, industrial, and residential 
zones existed, though there were rough :functional 
sections. lfhe main commercial district was lo-
cated in the center of the city, and with the adjoin-
ing Chugoku Regional Army Headquarters 
occupied the greater portion o:f the central island. 
Residential areas and military barracks over-
lapped and surrounded this central area. The 
bulk of the industries was located on the perim-
eter of the city, either on the southern ends o:f 
5 
the islands (where the Hiroshima airport was 
also situated) or to the east of the city. The 4 
square miles of densely built-up area in the heart 
of the city-residential, commercial, and mili-
tary-contained three-fifths o:f the total popula-
tion. If there were, as seems probable, about 
245,000 people in the city at the time of the attack, 
the density in the congested area must have been 
about 35,000 per square mile. Five completed 
evacuation programs and a sixth then in progress 
had reduced the population :from its wartime peak 
of 380,000. 
In Hiro;;;hima (and inN agasaki alSQ) the dwell-
ings ''ere of \Yood construction; about one-hn.l£ 
were one story and the remainder either one and 
one-half or tY\o stories. The roof coverings were 
mostly hard-burnt black tile. There were no ma-
sonry division walls, and large groups o:f dwellings 
clustered together. The type of construction, 
coupled with antiquated fire-fighting equipment 
and inadequately trained personnel, afforded even 
in peacetime a high possibility of conflagration. 
Many wood-framed industrial buildings were of 
poor construction by American standards. The 
principal points of weakness were the extremely 
small tenons, the inadequate tension joints, and 
the inadequate or poorly designed lateral bracings. 
Reinforced concrete :framed buildings showed a 
striking lack of uniformity in design and in quality 
of materials. Some of the construction details 
(reinforcing rod splices, :for example) were often 
poor, and much of the concrete was definitely 
weak; thus some reinforced concrete buildings col-
lapsed and suffered structural damage when within 
2;000 :feet of ground zero, and some internal wall 
paneling \Yas demolished even up to 3,800. :feet. 
(For convenience, the term "ground zero" will be 
used to designate the point on the ground directly 
beneath the point of detonation, or "air zero.") 
Other buildings, however, were constructed :far 
more strongly than is required by normal build-
ing codes in America, to resist earthquakes. Fur-
thermore, construction regulations in Japan have 
specified since the 1023 earthqualre that the roof 
must safely carry a minimum load of 70 pounds 
per square :foot whereas American requirements 
do not normally exceed 40 pounds per square :foot 
:for similar types. Though the regulation was 
not always followed, this extra strong construc-
tion was encountered in some of the buildings near 
ground zero at Hiroshima, and undoubtedly ac-
counts :for their _ability to withstand atomic bomb 
pressures without structural failures. Nearly 7 
percent of the residential units had been torn down 
to make firebreaks. 
Hiroshima before the war was the seventh larg-
est city in Japan, with a population of over 340,-
000, and was the principal administrative and 
commercial center of the southwestern part of the 
country. As the headquarters of the Second Army 
and of the Chugoku Regional Army, it was one 
of the most important military command stations 
in Japan, the site of one of the largest military 
supply depots, and the foremost military shipping 
point for both troops and supplies. Its shipping 
activities had virtually ceased by the time of the 
attack, however, because of sinkings and the min-
ing of the Inland Sea. It had been relatively 
unimportant industrially before the war, ranking 
only twelfth, but during the war new plants were 
built that increased its significance. These facto-
ries were not concentrated, but spread over the 
outskirts of the city; this location, we shall see, 
accounts for the slight industrial damage. 
The impact of the atomic bornb shattered the 
normal fabric of community life and disrupted 
the organizations for handling the disaster. In 
tl:te 30 percent of the population killed and the 
additional 30 percent seriously injured were in-
cluded corresponding proportions of the civic 
authorities and rescue groups. A mass flight from 
the city took place, as peTsons sought safety from 
the conflagration and a place for shelter and food. 
Within 24 hours, however; people were streaming 
back by the thousands in search of relatives and 
friends and to determine the extent of their prop-
erty loss. Road blocks had to be set up along all 
routes leading into the city, to keep curious and 
unauthorized people out. The bulk of the de-
housed population found refuge in the surround-
ing contryside; within the city the food supply 
was short and shelter virtually nonexistent. 
On 7 August, the commander of the Second 
Army assumed general command of the counter-
measures, and all military units and facilities in 
the area were mobilized for relief purposes. Army 
buildings on the periphery of the city provided 
shelter and emergency hospital space, and dis-
persed Army supplies supPlemented the slight 
amounts o£ food and clotl:::ag that had escaped de-
struction. The need far exceeded "\Yhat could be 
made available. Surviving civilians assisted; al-
though casualties in both groups had been heavy, 
190 policemen and over 2,000 members of the Civil-
6 
ian Defense Corps reported for duty on 7 August. 
The status of medical facilities and personnel 
dramatically illustrates the difficulties facing au-
thorities. Of more than 200 doctors in Hiroshima 
befo1·e the attack, over 90 percent were casualties 
and only about 30 p~~icia.~e aQ_le·~~orm 
their normal duties a month after the raid. Out 
of 1,780 ;1~-;s~~~-~54 / were - killed or injured. 
Though some stocks of supplies had been dispersed, 
many were destroyed. Only three out of 45 civil-
ian hospitals could be used, and two large Army 
hospitals were rendered unusable. Those within 
3,000 feet of ground zero were totally destroyed, 
and the mortality rate of the occupants was prac-
tically 100 percent. Two large hospitals of rein-
forced concrete construction were located 4,900 
feet from ground zero. The basic structures re-
mained erect but there was such severe interior 
damage that neither was able to resume operation 
as a hospital for some time and the casualty rate 
was approximately 90 percent, clue primarily to 
falling plaster, flying glass, and fire. Hospitals 
and clinics beyond7,000 feet, though often remain-
ing standing, were badly damaged and contained 
many casualties from flying glass or other missiles. 
With such elimination of facilities and person-
nel, the lack of care and rescue activities at the time 
of the disaster is understandable; still, the eyewit-
ness account of Father Siemes 1 shows how this 
lack of first-aid contributed to the seriousness of 
casualties. At the improvised first-aid stations, he 
eports: 
* * * Iodine is applied to the wounds but they are 
left uncleansed. Neither ointment nor other therapeutic 
agents are available. Those that have been brought in are 
laid on the floor and no one can give them any further 
care. ·what could one do when all means are lacking? 
Among the passersby, there are many who are uninjured. 
In a purposeless, insensate manner, distraught by the mag-
nitude of the disaster, inost of them rush by and none con-
ceives the thought of organizing help on his own initiative. 
They are concerned only with the welfare of their own 
families-in the official aid stations and hospitals, a good 
third or half of those that had been brought in died. They 
lay about there almost without care, and a very high per-
centage succumbed. Everything was lacking, doctors, as-
sistants, dressings, drugs, etc. * * *. 
Effective medical help had to be sent in from 
the outside, and arrived only after a considerable 
delay. 
Fire-fighting and rescue units were equally 
stripped of men and equipment. Father Siemes 
1 German-born .Jesuit professor at Jochi University, Tokyo; in 
the I-Iiroshim>l area when the bomb fell. 
-I 
,, 
HIROSHIMA before and after bombing. Area around ground zero. 1,000 foot circles. 
A. A. F. Photos 
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reports that 30 hours elapsed before any organized 
rescue parties were observed. In Hiroshima, only 
16 pieces of fir~-fighting equipment were available 
for fighting the conflagration, three of them bor-
rowed. However, it is unlikely that any public 
fire department in the world, even without damage 
to equipment or casualties to personnel, could have 
prevented development of a conflagration in Hiro-
shima, or combatted it with success at more than 
a few locations along its perimeter. The total fire 
damage would not have been much different. 
All utilities and transportation services were 
disrupted over varying lengths of time. In most 
cases, however, the demand fell off even more 
precipitously than the available supply, and where 
the service was needed it could be restored at a 
minimal level. Thus, through railroad service was 
possible on 8 August, only 2 days after the attack, 
when fire trucks still had to be used to pump water 
into the locomotives because of insufficient water 
pressure. Electric power from the general net-
work was available in most of the surviving parts 
of the city on 7 August, and only one plant, the 
Engineering Division of Mitsubishi Heavy In-
dustries, was hampered in its recovery by the in-
ability to obtain sufficient power for several weeks. 
The water reservoir, which was of reinforced 
concrete and earth-covered, was undamaged; it 
was near 1 y 2 miles from the blast center. However, 
70,000 breaks of pipe connections in buildings and 
dwellings were caused by blast and fire effects. No 
subsurface pipes were crushed and no leaks re-
sulted from blast as a direct cause, though several 
leaks in underground mains resulted from falling 
debris. Pressure in the city center dropped to zero 
because of the connection breaks and the damage 
to a 16- and a 14,inch water main where they 
crossed damaged bridges. Six sewer pumping 
stations were rendered inoperable by fire and blast 
within a radius of 1 mile. The remaining eight 
stations were only slightly damaged, but no effort 
was made to repair or operate them. \Vater tables 
rose at flood periods ancl lands behind revetments 
were inundated. 
Trolley cars, trucks, and railroad rolling stock 
suffered extensive damage. Transportation build-
ings (offices, stations, living quarters, and a few 
warehouses) were damaged by fire in the passenger 
station area, but damage was slight to the round-
houses, transit sheds, warehouses, and repair units 
in the classification and repair area. About 200 
railroad employees were killed, but by 20 August, 
.s 
1± days after the attack, 80 percent of the em-
ployees were at work. 
The electric power transmission and distribu-
tion system was wrecked; only power equipment of 
rugged construction, such as transformers, resisted 
the blast and heat within the devastated areas. In-
struments were damaged beyond repair, and 
switches, switchyard insulators, cables, and copper 
bus work were rendered unusable. The telephone 
system was approximately 80 percent damaged, 
and no service was restored until 15 August 1945. 
Industry in the center of the city was effectively 
wiped out. Though small workshops numbered 
several thousand, they represented only one-fourth 
of the total industrial production of Hiroshima, 
since many of them had only one or two workers. 
The bulk of the city's output came from large 
plants located on the outskirts of the city; one-
half of the industrial production came from only 
five firms. Of these larger companies, only one 
suffered more than superficial damage. Of their 
working force, 94 percent were uninjured. Since 
electric power was available, and materials and 
working force were not destroyed, plants ordi-
narily responsible for nearly three-fourths of 
Hiroshima's industrial production could have re-
sumed normal operation within 30 days of the 
attack had the war continued. 
Immediately after the attack, the presence of 
these nearly intact indu.stries spurred counter-
measures in an effort to retain for the nation's · 
war effort the potential output of the city. The 
prefectural governor issued a proclamation on 7 
August, calling for "a rehabilitation of the stricken 
city and an aroused fighting spirit to exterminate 
the devilish Americans." To prevent the spread 
of rumors and brace morale, 210,000 out-of-town 
newspapers were brought in daily to replace the 
destroyed local paper. vVith the surrender, how-
ever, reconstruction took on a slo\Yer tempo. On 
16 August, regular rationing was restm1ed. Care 
of the injured and disposal of corpses remained 
urgent, but other steps were few. 
By 1 November, the population of Hiroshima 
\Yas back to 137,000. The city required complete 
rebuilding. The entire heart, the main adminis-
trative and commercial as well as residential sec-
tion, was gone. In this area only about 50 build-
ings, all of reinforced concrete, remained stand-
ing. All of these suffered blast damage and all 
saYe abot1t a dozen were almost completely gutted 
by fire; only 5 could be used without major re-
' 1-
pa1rs. These burnt-out structural frames rose 
impressively from the ashes of the burned-over 
section where occasional piles of rubble or twisted 
steel skeletons marked the location of brick or 
steel frame structures. At greater distances light 
steel frame and brick structures remained un-
damaged. Blast damage to wood-frame buildings 
and to residences extended well beyond the burned-
over area, gradually becoming more erratic and 
spotty as distances \Yere reached where only the 
weakest buildings were damaged, until in the outer 
portions of the city only minor disturbances of the 
tile roofs or breakage of glass were visible. The 
official Japanese figures summed up the building 
destruction at 62,000 out of a total of 90,000 build-
ings in the urban area, or 69 percent. An addi-
tional 6,000 or 6.6 percent were severely damaged, 
and most of the others showed glass breakage or 
disturbance of roof tile. These figures show the 
magnitude of the problem facing the survivors. 
Despite the absence of sanitation measures, no 
epidemics are reported to have broken out. In 
view of the lack of medical facilities, supplies, and 
personnel, and the disruption of the sanitary sys-
tem, the escape from epidemics may seem surpris-
ing. The experience of other bombed cities in 
Germany and Japan shows that this is not an 
isolated case. A possible explanation may lie 
in the disinfecting action of the extensive fires. In 
later weeks, disease rates rose, but not sharply. 
3. N a:;asaki.-N agasaki is located on the best 
natural harbor of western Kyushu, a spacious in-
let in the mountainous coast. The city is a highly 
congested urban pattern extending for several 
miles along the narrow shores and up the valleys 
opening out from the harbor. Two riYers, divided 
by a mountain spur, form the two main valleys in 
whose basins the city lies: the Urakami River, in 
whose basin the atomic bomb fell, running into the 
harbor from a NNW direction, and the Nakashima 
River, running from the NE. This mountain spur 
and the irregular layout of the city effectively 
reduced the area of destruction. 
The main residential and commercial districts 
.are intermingled in these two river basins. The 
large industrial plants stretch up the \Yest shore of 
the bay and up the Urakami Valley. Though the 
metropolitan area of the city is officially about 35 
square miles and stretches far into the country-
side, the heavily built-up area is confined by the 
terrain to less than 4 square miles. The greatest 
population density thus approximated 65,000 per 
square mile even after the evacuations. 
Despite its excellent harbor, Nagasaki's com-
mei."cial importance, though great in previous cen-
turies, had declined in recent years because of the 
city's isolated peninsular position and the difficul-
ties of transportation through the mou11tains by 
inadequate roads and railroad . facilities. As a 
naval base it had been supplanted by Sasebo. In-
dustry gradually increased in importance, pri-
marily under Mitsubishi influence. The four larg-
est companies in the city were the Mitsubishi Ship-
yards, Electrical Equipment Works, Arms Plant, 
and Steel Works, employing nearly 90 percent of 
the city's labor force. Administratively, Nagasaki 
was by 1941 of merely local importance despite 
being the seat of the prefectural government. 
J3efore the atomic bombing on 9 August, Naga-
saki had experienced five small-scale air attacks 
in the previous 12 months, by an aggregate of 
136 planes which dropped a total of 270 tons of 
high explosive, 53 tons of incendiary, and 20 tons 
of fragmentation bombs. 
Of these, a raid of 1 August 1945 was most effec-
tive, with several bombs falling in the Mitsubishi 
Shipyards and Steel '"" orks. The scale of effect 
can. be roughly measured, however, by comparing 
the toll of building damage with that from the 
atomic bomb; in all these raids 276 residential 
buildings and 21 industrial buildings were de-
stroyed or badly damaged. When the atomic 
bomb fell, Nagasaki was comparatively intact. 
Because the most intense destruction was con~ 
fined to the U rakami Valley, the impact of the 
bomb on the city as a whole was less shattering 
than at Hiroshima. In addition, no fire storm 
occurred; indeed, a shift in wind direction helped 
control the fires. Medical personnel and facilities 
were hard-hit, however. Over 80 percent of the 
city's hospital beds and the Medical College were 
located within 3,000 feet of the center of the ex-
plosion, and were completely destroyed. Rein-
forced concrete buildings within this range, thong 
standing, were completely gutted by fire; build 
ings of wooden construction were destroyed b 
\.__fire and blast. The mortality rate in this grou 
~f buildings was between 75 and 80 percent. Ex 
act casualty figures for medical personnel are un-
known, but the city seems to have fared better 
than Hiroshima: 120 doctors were at work on 1 
November, about one-half of the preraid roster. 
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Casualties ''ere undoubtedly high: 600 out of 850 
medical students at the Nagasaki Medical College 
were killed and most of the others injured; and 
of the 20 faculty members, 12 were killed and ± 
others injured. 
Utilities and services were again disrupted. 
Both gas plants were destroyed, and the replace-
ment time was estimated at several months. 
Though the basic \Yater supply was not affected, 
thousands of residential feeder-line breaks were 
supplemented by eight breaks on a 14-inch main 
line and four breaks ·where another main line 
crossed a bridge. Electric power distribution 
and transmission systems were effectively de-
stroyed in the area of heaviest destruction, but 
power could be supplied to the other parts of the 
city almost immediately. 
Shipping was virtually unaffected. Trolley 
senice was halted both by the interruption in 
po\Yer supply and by damage to street cars. Na-
gasaki is at the end of a railroad spur line. The 
major damage >Yas sustained by track and railroad 
bridges. The rails buckled intermittently for a 
distance of 5,000 to 7,500 feet from ground zero, 
at points where burning debris set fire to wooden 
cross ties. Three bridges were displaced; rails 
were distorted and the tracks had to be completely 
rebuilt. The railroad stations were completely 
destroyed by blast and fire and the electric signal 
system was severely damaged. Rolling stock was 
slightly damaged, primarily by fire . Although the 
damage to equipment was not extensive, it was 
severe eno:ugh to curtail traffic for 48 hours, during 
which time sufficient emergency repair work was 
performed to permit resumption of limited traffic. 
Con.trol of relief measures was in the hands of 
the prefecture. The sequence of clearance and 
· repair activities illustrates the activities that were 
carried on. 
The city"s repair facilities were completely dis-
organized by the atomic bomb, so that \Yith the 
single exception of shutting off "·ater to the af-
fected areas no repairs were made to roads, bridges, 
water mains, or transportation installations by city 
forces. The prefecture took full responsibility :for 
such restoration as "·as accomplished, delegating 
to the sca~tered city help the task o:£ assisting in 
relief o:£ victims. There were only 3 survivors o:£ 
115 employees o:£ the street car company, and late as 
the middle o:£ November 1945 no cars were running. 
A week after the explosion, the water works offi-
cials made an effort to supply water to persons 
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attempting to live in the bombed-out areas, but the 
leakage was so great that the effort was abandoned. 
It :fell to the prefecture, therefore, to institute 
recovery measures even in those streets normally 
the responsibility of the city. 0:£ the entire public 
works construction group covering the Nagasaki 
city area, only three members appeared :for work 
and a ·week was required to locate and notify other 
survivors. On the morning o:£ 10 August, police 
rescue units and workers from the Kawaminami 
shipbuilding works began the imperative tasl{ o:£ 
clearing the Omura-Nagasaki pike, which was im-
passable for 8,000 feet. A path 6:1J2 :feet wide was 
cleared despite the intense heat from smouldering 
fires, and by 15 August had been widened to permit 
bYo-way traffic. No trucks, only rakes and shovels, 
were available :for clearing the streets, which were 
filled ·with tile, bricks, stone, corrugated iron, ma-
chinery, plaster, and stucco. Street areas affected 
by blast and not by fire were littered "·ith wood. 
Throughout the devastated area, all "·ounded had 
to be carried by stretcher, since no motor vehicles 
were able to proceed through the cluttend streets 
:for several days. The plan :for debris removal 
required clearance of a fe"· streets leading to the 
main highway; but there were :frequent delays 
caused by the heat o:£ smouldering fires and by 
calls for relief work. The debris was simply raked 
and shoveled off the streets. By 20 August the 
job was considered complete. The streets were not 
materially damaged by the bomb nor were the sur-
face or the abutments of the concrete bridges, but 
many of the wooden bridges \Yere totally or par-
tially destroyed by fire. 
Under the circumstances-fire, flight o:£ entire 
families, destruction o:£ official records, mass crema-
tion-identification of dead and the accurate count 
o:£ casualties was impossible. As at Hiroshima, the 
season o:£ the year made rapid disposal of bodies 
imperative, and mass cremation and mass burial 
were resorted to in the clays immediately after the 
attack. Despite the absence o:£ sanitary measures, 
no epidemics broke out here. The dysentery rate 
rose :from 25 per 100,000 to 125 per 100,000. A , 
census taken on 1 November 19±5 found a popula-
tion o:£ 142,700 in the city. 
At Nagasaki, the scale of destruction \Yas greater 
than at Hiroshima, though the actual area de-
stroyed was smaller because o:£ the terrain and the 
point o:£ fall o:£ the bomb. The Nagasaki Prefec-
tural Report describes vividly the impress o:£ the 
bomb on the city and its inhabitants: 
-y 
RESIDENTIAL AREAS, NAGASAKI. Shielded by hills, one congested area survived (note 
firebt·eak in the foreground). 
Anothet·, 1,000 feet nortbeast of ground zero was reduced to rubble. 
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Within a radius of 1 kilometer from ground zero, men 
and animals died almost instantaneously from the tre-
mendous blast pre·ssure and heat; houses and other struc-
tures were smashed, crushed and scattered; and fires 
broke out. The strong complex steel members of the 
structures of the Mitsubishi Steel Works were bent and 
twisted like jelly and the roofs of the reinforced con-
crete Xational Schools were crumpled and\ collapsed, 
indicating a force beyond imagination. Trees of all 
sizes lest their brapches or were uprooted or broken off 
at the trunk. 
Outside a radius of 1 kilometer and within a ratlius of 
2 kilometers from ground zero, some men and animals- died 
instantly frorh the great blast and heat, but the gt'Bat 
majority were seriously or superficially injured. Houses 
and other structures were completely destroyed -while 
fires broke out eYerywhere. Trees were uprooted and 
withe~,:ed by the heat. 
Outside a radius of 2 kilometers and within a radius 
of 4 kilometers from ground zero, men and animals suf-
fered yarious degrees of injury from window glass and 
other fragments scattered about by the blast and many 
were burned by the intense heat. Dwelling and other 
structures were half damaged by blast. 
Outside a radius of 4 kilometers and within a radius 
of 8 kilometers from the ground zero, living creatures were 
injured by materials blown about by the blast; the ma-
jority were only superficially wounded. Houses were half 
or only partially damaged. 
While the conflagration with its uniformly 
burnt-out area caught the attention at Hiroshima, 
the blast effects, with their resemblance to the 
aftermath of a hurricane, were most striking at 
Nagasaki. Concrete buildings had their sides fac-
ing the blast stove in like boxes. Long lines of 
steel-framed factory sheds, over a mile from 
ground zero, leaned their skeletons away from the 
explosion. Blast resistant objects such as tele-
phone poles leaned away from the center of the 
explosion; on the surrounding hills trees were 
blown clown within considerable areas. Although 
there \Yas no general conflagration, fires contrib-
uted to the total damage in nearly all concrete 
structures. Evidence of primary fire is more fre-
quent than at Hiroshima. 
Because parts of the city were protected by 
hills, more than one-half of the residential units 
escaped serious damage. Of the 52,000 residential 
units in the city on 1 August, 14,146 or 27.2 per-
cent were completely destroyed (by Japanese 
count) (11,494 of these ·were burned); 5,441 or 
10.5 percent were half-burned or destroyed; many 
of the remaining units suffered superficial or minor 
damage. In 558 nonresidential buildings in the 
built-up area of Nagasaki which the Survey 
studied, almost 60 percent of the usable floor area 
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\Yas destroyed or structurally damaged. Only 12 
percent \.Yas undamaged, the rest suffering super-
ficial or minor damage. 
The survival of a higher percentage of the 
buildings, then, distinguishes Nagasaki from Hiro-
shima, so also, on the other hand, does the damage 
to factories. In Nagasaki, only the Mitsubishi 
Dockyards among the ma,jor industries was re-
mote enough from the explosion to escape serious 
damage. The other three Mitsubishi firms, which 
were responsible together with the dockyards for 
over 90 percent of the industrial output of the city, 
were seriously damaged. The Arms Plant and the 
Steel \Yorks \Yere in the main area of damage. 
Plant officials estima,tecl that 58 percent of the 
value of the former and 78 percent of the value 
of the latter were destroyed: Survey investigators 
considered the two plants to be 50 percent de-
stroyed. The Mitsubishi Electric IV orks were on 
the edge of the main area of destruction, but sn£-
ferecl10 percent structural damage. · 
One or two paragraphs from the report o£ the 
commanding officer of Sasebo Naval District will 
illustrate the sort of damage clone to industrial in-
stallations. Of two plants of the Mitsubishi Arms 
Works, he reports : "-\ 
With the exception of the tunnel workshops and the 
half-underground workshops, the Ohashi and Mori Machi 
Plants were completely destroyed by collapse. Reinforced 
concrete structures in these plants were severely damaged 
internally-ceilings collapsed, fittings of all sorts wet·e 
destroyed, and equipment was damaged. Casting and 
forging shops in the Ohashi Plant were destroyed by fire. 
which broke out in those structures. The Mori Machi 
Plant was nearly completely destroyed by fire. Taking 
both plants together, 60 percent of the machinery installa-
tions was damaged. In the Ohashi Plant, from 80 to 9(} 
percent of the machiJ1ery can be used again ; in the Mori 
Machi Plant only 40· to 50 percent of the machinery car 
be used in the future. 
Or of the Mitsubishi Steel Works: 
Plant structures here (some north-light steel framed 
structures) suffered extensiYe damage to roofs a nd walls 
as steel plates were blown off. The frames themselves 
were bent, twisted, or toppled over, and several buildings 
caught fire. Hardly any of the machinery in the plant 
can be used again in its present condition. HoweYer, 
nearly 70 percent of the machinery can be repaired. 
In general, (as has proved true with high ex-
plosive or incendiary bombs also) the damage to 
machinery and other contents of a factory was less 
than damage to the buildings. In addition, the 
air burst of the atomic bomb meant that it acted 
indirectly on machine tools and other buildi 
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
H'>
-
T
H
E
 T
R
E
M
E
N
D
O
U
S 
P
R
E
SS
U
R
E
 O
F 
T
H
E
 B
L
A
ST
 b
en
t t
he
 s
te
el
 fr
am
e 
o
f t
he
 M
it
m
bi
sh
i 
St
ee
l 
W
or
ks
 (
ab
ot
tt 
2,
40
0 
fee
t 
so
u
th
 o
f g
ro
un
d 
ze
ro
 a
t 
N
ag
as
ak
i) 
a
w
a
y 
fro
m 
th
e 
e
x
pl
os
io
n.
 
N
ag
as
ak
i 
M
ed
ic
al
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 H
os
pi
ta
l 
in
 b
ac
kg
ro
un
d.
 
(P
ho
to
 ta
ke
n 
26
 A
ug
us
t 
19
45
 b
y 
Ja
pa
ne
se
.) 
contents. Though a few tools were blo"·n oYer by 
blast, almost all the serious damage was caused by 
debris from damaged buildings, overturning 
through mass movement of buildings, or burning 
of buildings. 
Thus the extent and sort of damage to machinery 
depended on the construction of the buildings 
housing them. In >Yood-frame buildings, 95 per-
cent of the machines were seriously damaged, but 
in reinforced concrete or steel framed buildings 
only one-third or one-fourth of the machines were 
affected seriously. As would be expected, fire 
caused much damage to machines in timber framed 
shops (practically all of which were destroyed up 
to 7,000 feet from ground zero) and some damage 
in other types of structure. Debris was a major 
cause of damage only in certain reinforced con-
crete buildings, where >Yalls and roofs collapsed. 
Shortage of raw materials had reduced opera-
tions at these four Mitsubishi plants to a fraction 
of their capacity. Had the raw material situation 
been normal and had the war continued, it is esti-
mated that restoration of production would have 
been possible though slow. The dockyard, which 
was affected mainly by the 1 August attack rather 
than by the atomic bomb, would have been able 
to produce at 80 percent of full capacity within 
3 or ± months. The steel works would have re~ 
quired a year to get into substantial production, 
the electric >Yorks could have resumed production /\ 
at a reduced rate >Yithin 2 months and been back 
at capacity within 6 months, and the arms plants 
would have required15 months to reach two-thirds 
of their former capacity. 
B. GENERAL EFFECTS 
1. Oasualties.-The most striking result of the 
atomic bombs was the great number of casualties. 
The exact number of dead and injured will never 
be kno>Yn because of the confusion after the ex-
plosions. ~~ted for might have 
been bun d beyond recoanition in the falling 
bgildings~posec o m one of the mass crema-
tions of the first week of recovery, or driven out 
of the city to die or recover without any record 
remammg. No sure count of even the preraid 
populations existed. Because of the decline in 
activity in the two port cities, the constant threat 
of incendiary raids, and the formal evacuation 
programs of the Government, an unkno>Yn number 
of the inhabitants had either drdted away from 
the cities or been removed according to plan. In 
15 
this uncertain situation, estimates of casualties 
have generally ranged between 100,000 and 180,000 
for Hiroshima, and between 50,000 and100,000 for 
Nagasaki. The Survey believes the dead at Hiro-
shima to have been between 70,000 and 80,000, \... 
with an equal number injured; at Nagasaki over 
35,000 dead and somewhat more than that injured 
seems the most plausible estimate. 
Most of the immediate casualties did not differ 
from those caused by incendiary or high-explo-
sive raids. The outstanding difference >YUS the 
presence of radiation effects, which became un-
mistakable about a week after the bombing. At 
the time of impact, however, the causes of death 
and injury were--fhrsh burns, secondary effects of 
blast and falling debris, and bt!l'J.TSfrom 51az"G;g 
bp-i-Mings. No records are available that give the 
relative importance of the -various types of in-
jury, especially for those who died immediately 
after the explosion. Indeed, many of these people 
undoubtedly died several times over, theoretically, 
since each >Yas subjected to several injuries, any 
one of >Yhich would have been fatal. The Hiro-
shima prefectural health department placed the 
proportion of deaths from burns (flash or flame) . 
at 60 percent, from falling debris at 30 percent£ 
. and from other injuries at 10 percent; it is gener-
ally agreed that burns caused at least 50 percent 
of the initial casualties. 0£ those who died later, 
an increasing proportion succumbed to radiation 
effects. 
The seriousness of these radiation effects may 
be measured by the fact that 95 percent of the 
traced survivors of the immediate explosion >Yho 
were within 3,000 feet suffered from radiation dis-
ease. Colonel Stafford vVarren, in his testimony 
before the Senate Committee on Atomic Energy, 
estimated that radiation was responsible for 7 
to 8 percent of the total deaths in Jh.a...bm cities. 
Most medical investigators ,~1~ent some time 
in the areas feel that this estimate is far too low; 
it is generally felt that no less than-l5-te--26-per-
cent of the deaths were from radiation. In addi-
tion, there were an equal number who were casual-
ties but survived, as \Yell as uncounted thousands 
who probably were affected by the gamma rays but 
not enough to produce definite illness. 
A plausible estimate of the importance of the 
various causes of death would ran~ as follows: 
Flash buri1s, 20 to 30 percent. l 
Other injuries, 50 to 60 percent. 
Radiation sickness, 15 to 20 percent. 1 
I 
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If we examine the nature of the casualties under 
each group of causes we find familiar and un-
fru_rli!iE:-e~. 
·' Flash buTns.-The flash of the explosion, >Yhich 
w'as extremely brief, emitted radiant heat travel-
ling at the speed of light. Flash burns thus fol-
lowed the explosion instantaneously. The :fact 
that relatively few victims suffered burns of the 
eyeballs should not be interpreted as an indication 
that the radiant heat followed the flash, or that 
time was required to build up to maximum heat 
intensity. The explanation is simply that the 
structure of the eye is more resistant to heat than 
is average human skin, and near ground zero the 
recessed position of the eyeball offered protection 
from the overhead explosion. Peak temperatures 
lasted only momentarily. 
Survivors in the two cities stated that people 
who were in the open directly under the explosion 
of the bomb were so severely burned that the skin 
was charred clark brown or black and that they 
died within a few minutes or hours. 
Among the survivors, the burned areas of the 
skin showed evidence of burns almost immediately 
after the explosion. At first there was marked 
redness, and other evidence of thermal burns ap-
peared within the next few minutes or hours, de-
pending on the degree of the burn. Uninfectecl 
burns healed promptly without any unusual clini-
cal features, according to the Japanese physicians 
who attended the cases. American medical ob-
servers noted only a tendency to formation of ex-
cess scar tissue, which could be satisfactorily ex-
plained as the result of malnutrition and the large 
degree of secondary infection that complicated 
healing of the burn~_:-l'he.r_~~ew in-
stances -of burn_s .nealing with contractures.._ancl 
limitation of the mobility of certain joints, such 
as the elbows or knees. In many instances, these 
primary burns of minor nature were completely 
healed before patients developed evidence of 
radiation effects. 
Because of the brief duration of the flash wave 
and the shielding effects of almost any objects-
leaves a:ucl clothing as well as buildings-there 
were many interesting cases of protection. The 
radiant heat came in a direct line like light, so 
that the area burned corresponded to this directed 
exposure. Persons whose sides were toward the 
explosion often showed definite burns of both sides 
of the bacl\: while the hollow of the back escaped. 
People in buildings or honses were apparently 
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burned only if directly exposed through the win-
dows. The most striking instance was that of a 
man writing before a window. His hands were 
seriously burned but his exposed face and . neck 
suffered only slight burns due to the angle of entry 
of the radiant heat through the window. 
Flash burns were largely confined to exposed 
areas of the body, but on occasion would occur 
through varying thicknesses of clothing. Gener-
ally speaking, the thicker the clothing the more 
likely it was to give complete protection against 
flash burns. One woman was burned over the 
shoulder except for a T -shaped area about one-
fourth inch in breadth; the T -shaped area corre-
sponded to an increased thickness of the clothing 
from the seam of the garment. Other people were 
burned through a single thickness of kimono but 
were unscathed or only slightly affected under-
neath the lapel. In other instances, skin was 
burned beneath tightly fitting clothing but was 
unburned beneath loosely fitting portions. Fi-
ually, white or light colors reflected heat and 
afforded some protection; people wearing black 
or dark-colored clothing were more likely to be 
burned. 
-{jJ theT injm'ies.-Because of the combination of 
factors at the area near the center of the explosion, 
the casualty effects of blast are hard to single out. 
I£ it is remembered that even directly under the 
explosion, people were several hundred feet away 
from the air-burst, it will be easier to understand 
why true blast effects were relatively rare. Only 
toward the periphery of the affected zone was the 
blast effect lateral and likely to throw people vio-
lently against buildings, and at the periphery the 
intensity of the blast had fallen off sharply. Com-
paratively few instances were reported of arms or 
legs being torn from the body by flying debris. 
Another indication of the rarity of over-pressure is 
the scarcity of ruptured eardrums. Among 106 
Yictims examined by the Japanese in Hiroshima on 
11 and 12 August, only three showed ruptured ear-
drums; a study done in October at the Omura hos-
pital near Nagasaki revealed that only two of 92 
cases had ruptured eardrums. Only at Nagasaki 
were there reports of over-pressure in the shock 
wave. Some of the dead were said by survivors to 
have had their abdomens ruptured and intestines 
protruding; others were reported to have protrud-
ing eyes and tongues, and to have looked as if they 
had drowned. Thorough check by Allied investi-
gators discredited these stories as evidence of di-
rect blast effects; the normal effects of blast are 
internal hemorrhage and crushing. These exter-
nal signs point to injuries from debris rather than 
blast. 
Injuries produced by falling and flying debris 
were much more numerous, and naturally increased 
in number and seriousness nearer the center of the 
affected area. The collapse of the buildings was 
sudden, so that thousands of people were pinned 
beneath the debris. Many were able to extricate 
themselves or received aid in escaping, but large 
numbers succumbed either to their injuries or to 
fire before they could be extricated. The flimsiness 
of Japanese resiclental construction should not be 
allowed to obscure the dangers of collapse; though 
the \Yalls and partitions were light, the houses had 
heavy roof .timbers and heavy roof tiles. Flying 
glass from pam•ls also caused a large numper of 
casualties, even up to 15,000 feet from ground zero. 
The number of buri1s from secondary fires was 
slight among survivors, but it was probable that a 
large number of the deaths in both cities came 
from the burning of people caught in buildings. 
Eyewitness accounts a,gree that many fatalities 
occurred in this way, either immediately or as a 
result of the lack of care for those who did extricate 
themselves with serious burns. There are no ref-
erences, ~owever, to people in the streets suc-
cumbing either to heat or to carbon monoxide as 
they did in Tokyo or in Hamburg, Germany. A 
:few burns resulted :from clothing set afire by the 
flash wave, but in most cases people were able to 
beat out such fires without serious injury to the 
skin. 
f Radiation disease.-The radiation effects upon 
survivors resulted :from the gamma rays liberated 
by the fission process rather than :from induced 
radio-activity or the lingering radio-activity of 
deposits of primary fission products. Both at 
Nagasaki and at Hiroshima, pockets o:f radio-ac-
tivity have been detected where fission products 
w·ere directly deposited, but the degree of activity 
in these areas was insufficient to produce casualties. 
Similarly, induced radio-activity :from the inter-
action of neutrons with matter caused no authenti-
cated fatalities. But the effects o:f gamma rays-
here used in a general sense to include all pene-
trating high-frequency radiations and neutrons 
that caused injury-are well established, even 
though the Allies had no observers in the affected 
areas for several weeks after the explosions. 
Our understanding of radiation casualties is not 
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complete. In part the deficiency is in our basic 
knowledge o:f how radiation affects animal tissue. 
In the words of Dr. Robert Stone of the Man-
hattan Project, "The :fundamental mechanism of 
the action o:f radiation on living tissues has not 
been understood. All methods of treatment have 
therefore been symptomatic rather than specific. 
For this reason, studies into the :fundamental 
nature o:f the action o:f radiation have been carried 
on to some extent, the limitation being that it was 
unlikely that significant results could be obtained 
during the period of war." 
According to the . J apa~1ese, those individuals 
very near the center o:f the explosion but not af-
fected by flash burns or secondary injuries became 
ill within 2 or 3 days. Bloody diarrhea :followed, 
and the victims expired, some within 2 to 3 clays 
after the onset and the majority within a week. 
Autopsies showed remarkable changes in the blood 
picture-almost complete absence of white blood 
cells, and deterioration of bone marro\v. Mucous 
membranes of the throat, lungs, stomach, and the 
intestines showed acute inflammation. 
The majority of the radiation cases, who were 
at greater distances, did not show severe symptoms 
until 1 to 4 weeks after the explosion, though 
many :felt \Yeak and listless on the :following day. 
After a clay or two of mild nausea and Yomiting, 
the appetite improved and the person felt quite 
well until symptoms reappeared at a later date. 
In the opinion of some Japanese physicians, those 
who rested or subjected themselves to less physi-
cal exertion showed a longer delay before the 
onset of subsequent symptoms. The first signs 
of recurrence were loss of ap.petite, lassitude, and 
general cliscomfort~mmation of the gums. 
mouth, and pharynx appeared next. \Yithin 12-
to 48 hours, fever bec~me evident. In many in-
stances it reached only 100° Fahrenheit and re-
mained :for only a :few days. In other cases. the 
temperature went as high as 104° or 106° Fahren-
heit. \ The degree o:f fever apparently had a direct 
relation to the degree of exposure to radiation. 
Once developed, the :fever wa~ usually \Yell sus-
tained, and in those cases terminating fatally it 
continued high until the end. I:f the :fever sub-
sided, ·the patient usually sho,Yed a rapid disap-
pearance of other symptoms and soon regained his 
:feeling of good health. ) The other symptoms com-
monly seen "·ere shortage o:f white corpuscles, loss 
o:f hair, inflammation and gangrene of the gums, 
inflammation of the mouth and pharynx, ulcera-
tion of the lower gastro-intestinal tract, small livid 
spots (petechiae) resulting from escape of blood 
into the tissues of the skin or mucous membrane, 
and larger hemorrhages of gums, nose and skin. 
Loss of hair usually began about 2 weeks afte1· 
the bomb explosion, though in a few instances it is 
reported to have begun as early as 4 to 5 clays 
afterward. The areas were involved in the fol-
lowing order of frequency ''ith variations de-
pending on the degree of exposure: scalp, arm-
pits, beard, pubic region, and eyebrows. Com-
plete baldness was rare. Microscopic study of the 
body areas involved has shown atrophy of the 
hair follicles. In those patients who survived after 
2 months, however, the hair has commenced to re-
grow. An interesting but unconfirmed report has 
it that loss of the hair \Yas less marked in persons 
with g'rey hair than in those with dark hair. 
A decrease in the number of white blood cor-
puscles in the circulating blood appears to have 
been a constant accompaniment of radiation dis-
ease, even existing in some milder cases without 
other radiation effects. The degree of leukopenia 
was probably the most accurate index of the 
amount of radiation a person received. The nor-
mal white blood count averages 5,000 to 7,000: 
leukopenia is indicated by a count of 4,000 or less. 
The white blood count in the more severe cases 
ranged from 1,500 to 0, with almost entire disap-
pearance of the bone marrow. The moderately 
severe cases showed evidence of degeneration of 
bone marrow and total white blood counts of 1,500 
to 3,000. The milder cases showed white blood 
counts of 3,000 to -t,OOO with more minor degen-
eration changes in the bone marrow. The changes 
in the system for forming red blood corpuscles 
developed later, but \Yere equally severe. 
Radiation clearly affected reproduction, though 
the extent has not been determined. Sterility has 
been a common finding throughout Japan, espe-
cially under the conditions of the last 2 years, 
but there are signs of an' increase in the Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki areas to be attributed to the radia-
tion. Sperm counts done in Hiroshima under 
American supervision revealed low sperm counts 
or complete aspermia for as long as 3 months 
afterward in males who were within 5,000 feet 
of the center of the explosion. Cases dying of 
radiation disease shmYed clear effects on sperma-
togenesis. Study of sections of ovaries from au-
topsied radiation victims has not yet been com-
pleteted. T,h.~ 1b ~gmmt wo-
~en are£ markeclL.Q~wever. ObYon~ious 
~ -lrithin--3,DDCL:f..eet 
of ground_z.ero all known cases. J1~tY.e had mis-
carritrg~s:---Even up to 6,500 feet they have had 
miscarriages or premature infants who died 
shortly after birth. In the group between 6,500 
and 10,000 feet, about one-third have given birth 
to apparently normal children. Two months after 
the explosion, the city's total incidence of mis-
carriages, abortions, and premature births was 
27 percent as compared with a normal rate of 6 
percent. I Since other factors than radiation con-
tributed to this increased rate, a period of years 
will be required to learn the ultimate effects of 
mass radiation upon reproduction. 
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Treatment of victims by the Japanese was lim-
ited by the lack of medical supplies and facilities. 
Their therapy consisted of small amounts of vita-
mins, liver extract, and an occasional blood trans-
fusion. Allied doctors used penicillin and plasma 
with beneficial effects. Liver extract seemed to 
benefit the few patients on whom it \Yas used: It 
was given in small frequent doses when available. 
A large percentage of the cases died of secondary 
(lisease, such as septic bronchopneumonia or tuber-
culosis, as a result of lowered resistance. Deaths 
from radiation began about a week after exposure 
and reached a peak in 3 to 4 weeks. They had 
practically ceased to occur after 7 to 8 weeks. 
Unfortunately, no exact definition of the kill-
ing power of radiation can yet be given, nor a 
satisfactory acccunt of the sort and thickness of 
concrete or earth that will shield people. From 
the definitive report of the Joint Commission will 
come more nearly accurate statements on these 
matters. In the meanwhile the awesome lethal 
effects of the atomic bomb and the insidious addi-
tional peril of the galllma mys speak for them-
selves. 
There is reason to l::elieve that if the effects of 
blast and fire had been entirely absent from the 
bombing, the number of deaths among people 
within a radius of one-half mile from ground zero 
would have been almost as great as the actual 
figures and the deaths among those within 1 mile 
would have been only slightly less. The principal 
difference 'youlcl have been in the time of the 
deaths. Instead of being killed outright as were 
most of these victims, they would have survived 
for a few clays or even 3 or 4 weeks, only to die 
eventually of radiation disease. 
These suppositions have vital importance, for 
actuallJr in Nagasaki and Hiroshima many people 
who were protected by structures against blast 
and fire were not protected against the effect of 
gamma rays. The complexity of the problem of 
shelter protection has been increased by this ne-
cessity of shielding against radiant heat and 
gamma rays. Fortunately, earth and concrete will 
shield against gamma mys, the required thickness 
varying with the intensity of the rays. 
The slow and inadequate treatment of victims 
by the Japanese probably contributed to the high 
casualty rates. Many persons could undoubtedly 
have been saved had facilities, supplies, and per-
sonnel been available immediately after the bomb-
ings. Probably the number of deaths from the 
true blast effects, flame burns, or serious injuries 
from collapsing structures would not have been 
altered appreciably; generally speaking, these 
cases either were killed outright or else survived. 
Many of the flash burn cases could have been saved 
with tremendous quantities of plasma and paren-
teral fluids if treatment could have begun witl1in 
a few hours after the bombing. Probably the most. 
significant results could have been achieved with 
the radiation cases. With large quantities of whole 
blood and adequate supportive treatment, possibly 
10 to 20 percent of those dying of radiation might 
have survived. However, it is doubtful that 10 
percent of all the deaths resulting from the atomic 
bombs could have been avoided with the best med-
ical care. A more likely figure is 5 to 8 percent-
~ JJ! orale.2-As might be expected, the primary 
:eaction to the bomb was fear-uncontrolled terror, 
strengthened by the sheer horror of the destruc-
tion and suffering witnessed and experienced by 
the survivors. Between one-half and two-thirds 
of those interviewed in the Hiroshima and N aga-
saki areas confessed having such reactions, not just 
for the moment but for some time. As two sur-
vivors put it: 
Whenever a plane was seen after that, people would 
rush into their shelters: They went in and out so much 
that they did not have time to eat. They were so nervous 
they could not work. 
After the atomic b.omb fell, I just couldn't stay home. I 
would cook, but while cooking I would always be watching 
out and worrying whether an atomic bomb would fall 
near me. 
The behavior of the living immediately after the 
I 
2 An U. S. S. B. S. llforale diYision team Interviewed a scien-
tifically selected sample of almost 250 persons: 128 from Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki cities, and 120 from tb~ immediately "ur-
rounding an•as. 'l'he same Rtandard ClUPstions Wf'rf' put t"o t hP;..:f' 
pPople and Rimilar gToups in repreRPntnth·e .Tnpn11e:-:t• ciliP:-:. 
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bombings, as described earlier, clearly shows the 
state of shock that hindered rescue efforts. A 
Nagasaki survivor illustrates succinctly the mood 
of survivors : 
All I saw was a flash and I felt my body get warm and 
then I saw e\·erything flying around. My grandmother 
was hit Oil the bead by a flying piece of ro.of and she wa;; 
l.JJcecling * * * I became hysterical seeing my grand-
mother bleeding and we just ran around without knowing 
what to do. 
I was working at the ofiice. I was talking to a frienLI 
at the window. I saw the whole city in a red flame, then 
I clucked. The pieces of the glass hit my back and face. 
JUy dress was torn off by the glass. Then I got up and 
ran to the mountain where the good shelter was. 
The two typical impulses were those : Aimless, 
even hysterical activity or flight from the city to 
shelter and food. 
The accentuated effect of these bombs came not 
only from the surprise and their crushing power, 
but also from the feeling of security among the 
inhabitants of the two cities before the attacks. 
Though Nagasaki had undergone five raids in the 
previous year, they had not been heavy, and Hi,ro-
shima had gone almost untouched until the morn-
ing of 6 August 1945. In both cities many people 
felt that they would be spared, and the various 
rumors in circulation supporting such feeling 
covered a wide range of wishful thoughts. There 
were so many Christians there, many Japanese-
Americans came from Hiroshima, the city was a 
famous beauty spot-these and other even more 
fantastic reasons encouraged hopes. Other people 
felt vaguely that their city was being saved for 
"something big," however. 
Such a shattering event could not fail to have 
its impact on people's ways of thinking. Study 
of the patterns of belief about the war, before and 
after the bombing, show this change clearly. 
Prior to the dropping of the atomic bombs, the 
people of the two target cities appear to have had 
fewer misgivings about the war than people in 
other cities. Response to set questions indicate 
that among Japanese civilians prior to 1 July 
1945: 
59 percent in the Hiroshima-Nagasaki areas 
but 
74 percent in the other urban areas entertained 
doubts about a Japanese Victory; 
31 percent in Hiroshima-~ agasaki but 
47 percent in other urban areas felt certain 
that victory for Japan was impossible; 
12 peJ'CPnt ir1 Hiroshima-Nagasaki but 
34 percent in other urban areas had reached a 
point where they felt unable to continue the 
war. 
Further, 
28 percent of the people of Japan as a whole 
said they had never reached a point where 
they felt they could not go on with the war, 
whereas 
39 percent of the people in the Hiroshima-
Nagasaki areas said they had never reached 
such a point. 
These figures clearly suggest that the will to resist 
had indeed been higher in the "atomic bomb cit-
ies" than in Japan as a whole. 
There is no doubt that the bomb was the most _ 
important influence among the people of these 
areas in making them think that defeat was in-
evitable. An additional 28 percent stated that 
after the atomic bomb was dropped they became 
convinced that victory for Japan was impossible. 
Almost one-fomth admitted that because of the 
bombing they felt personally unable to carry on. 
Forty percent testified to various degrees of de-
featism induced by the atomic bomb. Signifi-
cantly, certainty of defeat was much more preva-
lent at Hiroshima, where the area of devastation 
and the casualties were greater, than at Nagasaki. 
Typical comments of survivors were: 
If the enemy has this type of bomb, everyone is going 
to clie, and we wish the war would hurry and finish. 
I did not expect that it was that powerful. I thought 
we have no defense against such a bomb. 
One of my children was killed by it, and I didn't care 
what happened after that. 
_Other reactions were found. In view of their 
experiences, it is not remarkable that some of the 
survivors (nearly one-fifth) hated the Americans 
for using the bomb or expressed their anger in 
such terms as "cruel," "inhuman," and "barbarous." 
* * * they really despise the Americans for it, the 
people all say that if there are such thing3 as ghosts, why 
don't they haunt the Americans? 
Wh.7nJ saw the injured and killed, I felt bitter against 
the eftlejiy. 
After the atomic bomb exploded, I felt that now I must 
go to work in a munitions plant * * *. My sons told 
me tha.t they wouldn't forget the atomic bomb even when 
they grow up. 
The reaction of hate and anaer is not surprisina b bl 
and it is likely that in fact it was a more extensive 
sentiment than the figures indicate, since unques-
tionably many respondents, out of -fear or polite-
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ness, did not reveal their sentiments with complete 
candor. Despite this factor, the frequency of hos-
tile sentiments seems low. Two percent of the 
respondents even volunteered the observation that 
they did not blame the United States for using the 
bomb. There is evidence that some hostility was 
turned against their own Government, either be-
fore or after the surrender, although only a few 
said they \\'ondered why their nation could not 
have made the bomb. In many instances the re-
action was simply one of resignation. A common 
comment was, "Since it "·as war, it was just 
shikata-ga-nai (Too bad)." 
Admiration for the bomb was more frequently 
expressed than anger. Over one-fourth of the 
people in the target cities and surrounding area 
said they were impressed by its power and by the 
scientific skill which underlay its discovery and 
production. 
Of greater significance are the reactions of the 
Japanese people as a whole. The two raids were 
all-Japan events and \Yere intended so: The Allied 
Powers were trying to break the fighting spirit of 
the Japanese people and their leaders, not just of 
the residents of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Vir-
tually all the Japanese people had a chance to 
react to the bomb though the news had not 
reached to full spread at the time of the surrender. 
By the time the interviewing was done, only about 
2 percent of the population in rural areas and 1 
percent in the cities had not heard of the bomb. 
The reactions found in the bombed cities ap-
peared in the country as a whole-fear and terror, 
anger and hatred against the users, admiration for 
the scientific achievement-though in •each case 
with less intensity. The effect of the bomb on 
attitudes toward the war in Japan as a whole was, 
however, much less marked than in the target 
cities. While 40 percent of the latter respondents 
reported defeatist feelings induced by the bomb, 
28 percent of those in the islands as a whole at-
tributed such reactions to the news of the bomb. 
There are at least three possible explanations of 
this difference. First, the level of confidence was 
quite low in Japan \\'ell before the time of the 
atomic bombing. Prior to 1 July 1945 doubts 
about a Japanese victory were felt by 74 percent 
of the population. By the same data 47 percent 
had become certain that a Japanese victory was 
impossible, and 3-l: percent felt that they cou1d not 
go on with the war. Under these circumstances, 
the announcement of a new and devastating 
weapon was merely an addition to the already 
eloquent evidence of national weakness. Second, 
the reaction of those at some distance from the 
target cities seems to have been blunted by their 
direct experience with other sorts of misfortunes 
and hardships, the common phenomenon of psycho-
logical distance increasing with geographical dis-
tance. In Japan as a whole, for example, military 
losses and failures, such as those at Saipan, the 
Philippines, and Okinawa, \Yere twice as impor-
tant as this atomic bomb in inducing certainty 
of defeat. Other raids over Japan as a whole \\ere 
more than three times as important in this re-
spect. Consumer deprivations, such as food short-
ages and the attendant malnutrition, were also 
more important in bringing people to the point 
where they felt they could not go on with the war. 
Third, the lack of understanding of the mean-
ing of the new weapon in areas away from the 
target undoubtedly limited its demoralizing effect. 
As distance from the target cities increased, the 
effectiveness of the bombs in causing certainty of 
defeat declined progressively: 
Percent oj population ce•·-
Group of cities. tain of ilefe?t because 
· · of atomw bomb 
Hiroshima-~lagasaki ------ --- ----- - - ---- ---- 25 
Cities nearest to target cities_________________ 23 
Cities near to target cities_____ ____ _____ _____ 1;) 
Cities far from target cities_____________ ______ 8 
Cities farthest from target cities____________ 6 
Only in the nearest group of cities, within 40 
miles of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, was there a sub-
stantial effect on morale. W ere the channels of 
mass communication as readily aYailable to all 
the population as they are in the Unite<l States 
and had the use of the bomb received anythillg 
like the intensive coverage it had here, the effect 
on continued support of the war would probably 
have been greater. Something approaching such 
knowledge, of course, probably would have spread 
rather widely had the war continued many more 
weeks, whether sanctioned by the censors or 
spread by the ever-active rumor channels so com-
mon in the country. 
It is apparent that the effect of the atomic bomb-
ings on the confidence of the Japanese civilian 
population was remarkably localized. Outside of 
the target cities, it \Yas subordinate to other de-
moralizing experiences. The effect \Yhich it did 
have was probably due largely to the number of 
casualties and the nature of the injuries received. 
These consequences were in part the result of 
surprise and the vulnerability of the raid defense 
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system. Properly enforced warnings, precau-
tions and an emergency care organization of the 
scale of the bomb's effects might have reduced 
casualties and, therefore, the effects on morale. 
Even in the target cities, it must be emphasized, 
the atomic bombs did not uniformly destroy the 
Japanese fighting spirit. Hiroshima and N aga-
saki, when compared with other Japanese cities, 
were not more defeatist than the average. The 
bombs were tremendous personal catastrophes to 
the survivors, but neither time nor understanding 
of the revolutionary threat of the atomic bomb 
permitted them to see in these personal catastro-
phes a final blow to Japan's prospects for victory 
or negotiated peace. 
-.3l. The Japan ese decision to su?'1"ender.-The 
further question of the effects of the bombs on the 
morale of the Japanese leaders and their decision 
to abandon the war is tied up with other factors. 
The atomic bomb had more effect on the thinking 
of Government leaders than on the morale of the 
rank and file of civilians outside of the target 
areas. It cannot be said, however, that the atomic 
bomb convinced the leaders who effected the peace 
of the necessity of surrender. The decision to seek 
ways and means to terminate the war, influenced 
in part by knowledge of the low state of popular 
morale, had been taken in May 1945 by the Su-
pl;eme War Guidance Council. 
As early as the spring of 19-:1:4, a group of for-
mer pJ·ime ministers -and others close to the Em-
perOI· had been making efforts toward bringing the 
war to an end. This group, including such men as 
Admiral Okada, Admiral Yonai, Prince Konoye, 
and Marquis Kido, had been influential in effecting 
Tojo's resignation and in making Admiral Suzuki 
Prime Minister after Koiso's fall. Even in the 
Suzuki cabinet, however, agreement was far from 
unanimous. The Navy Minister, Admiral Y onai, 
was sympathetic, but the War Minister, General 
Anami, usually represented the fight-to-the-end 
policy of the Army. In the Supreme War Guid-
ance Council, a sort of inner cabinet, his adherence 
to that line -was further assured by the participa-
tion of the Army and Navy chiefs of staff, so that 
on the peace issue this organization was evenly 
divided, with these three opposing the Prime Min-
ister, Foreign Minister, and Navy Minister. At 
any time military (especially Army) dissatis-
faction with the Cabinet might have eventuated at 
least in its fall and possibly in the "liquidation'' of 
the antiwar members. 
Thus the problem facing the peace leaders in the 
Government was to bring about a surrender despite 
the hesitation of the War Minister and the opposi-
tion of the Army and Navy chiefs of staff. This 
had to be done, moreover, without precipitating 
counter measures by the Army which would elimi-
nate the entire peace group. This was clone ulti-
mately by bringing the Emperor actively into the 
decision to accept the Potsdam terms. So long as 
the Emperor openly supported such a policy and 
could be presented to the country as doing so, the 
military, which had fostered and lived on the idea 
of complete obedience to the Emperor, could not 
effectively rebel. 
A preliminary step in this direction had been 
taken at the Imperial Conference on 26 June. At 
this meeting, the Emperor, taking an active part 
despite his custom to the contrary, stated that he 
desired the development of a plan to end the war as 
well as one to defend the home islands. This was 
followed by a renewal of earlier efforts to get the 
Soviet Union to intercede with the United States, 
which were effectively answered by the Potsdam 
Declaration on 26 July and the Russian declara-
tion of war on 9 August. 
The atomic bombings considerably speeded up 
these political maneuverings within the govern-
ment. This in itself was partly a morale effect, 
since there is ample evidence that members of the 
Cabinet were worried by the prospect of further 
atomic bombings, especially on the remains of 
Tokyo. The bombs did not convince the military 
that defense of the home islands was impossible, if 
their behavior in Government councils is adequate 
testimony. It did permit the Government to say, 
however, that no army IYithout the weapon could 
possibly resist an enemy IYho had it, thus saving 
"face" for the Army leaders and not reflecting on 
the competence of Japanese industrialists or the 
valor of the Japanese soldier. In the Supreme 
vVar Guidance Council voting remained divided, 
with the war minister and the two chiefs of staff 
unwilling to accept unconditional surrender. 
There seems little doubt, however, that the bomb-
ing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 1nakened their 
inclination to oppose the peace group. 
The peace effort culminated in an Imperial con-
ference held on the night of 9 August and con-
tinued into the early hours of 10 August, for which 
the stage was set by the atomic bomb and the Rus-
sian war declaration. At this meeting the Em-
peror, again breaking his customary silence, stated 
specifically that he wanted acceptance of the 
Potsdam terms. 
A quip was cunent in high Government circles 
at this time that the atomic bomb was the real 
Kamikaze, since it saved Japan from further use-
less slaughter and destruction. It is apparent 
that in the atomic bomb the Japanese found the 
opportunity which they had been seeking, to break 
the existing deadlock within the Government over 
acceptance of the Potsdam terms. 
III. HOW THE ATOMIC BOMB WORKS 
Out of the stories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
can be built up, detail by detail, the picture of 
how the atomic bomb works-the different forms 
of energy given off, the velocity and intensity of 
each, the sort of effects each has on animate and 
inanimate objects. In these factors is the real 
story of what happened at Hiroshima and N aga-
saki, for in them chance circumstances are ruled 
out. 
Spectators' accounts, whether of the New Mex-
ico, the Hiroshima, or the Nagasaki explosion, de-
scribe similar pictures. At Nagasaki, fo; example, 
the bomb exploded at 1102 with a tremendous flash 
of blue-white light, like a giant magnesium flare. 
The flash was accompanied by a rush of heat and 
was followed by a huge pressure wave and the 
rumbling sound of the explosion. Curiously 
enough, this sound was not distinctly noted by 
those who survived near the center of the explo-
sion, although it was heard as far as 15 miles away. 
People on the hillsides in the country at a con-
siderable distance from Nagasaki told of seeing 
the blue-white and then multicolored flash over 
the city, followed some seconds later by a tre-
mendous clap, like thunder very close overhead. 
A huge snow-white cloud shot rapidly into the 
sky and the scene on the ground was obscured first 
by a bluish haze and then by a purple-brown cloud 
of dust and smoke. 
The survivors were not aware at the time that 
a radically new bomb had been used. They were 
conscious of an explosion of tremendous power, 
but even the Government had no conception, until 
President Truman's am1ouncement was broadcast, 
of the new principle of operation. If we strip our 
minds of any lingering prejudice that the atomic 
bomb is supernatural or incomprehensible in its 
operation, we shall see why its uniqueness was not 
at first recognized. 
A. THE NATURE OF THE EXPLOSION 
The atomic bomb works by explosion. An ex-
plosion is, in the words of the Smyth report, sim-
ply a "sudden and violent release of a large amount 
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of energy in a small region." As do ordinary high 
explosives, atomic bombs release energy, though 
on an unprecedented scale, The energy takes three 
forms (one of which is new), and all the effects 
of the bomb can be referred directly to these three 
kinds of energy. They are: 
(1) Heat (which is present in other explosions, 
as the familiar injuries known as "flash burns" 
on warships illustrate, but ordinarily not at l~igh 
enough diffused temperatures to burn a man or 
set fire to combustible objects at any considerable 
distance from the explosion) . 
(2) Radiation (similar to X-rays or to that 
from radium). 
(3) Blast or pressure (as from a demolition 
bomb) . 
The whole discussion of the effects of the atomic 
bomb will be phrased in terms of these three kinds 
of energy. No other more mysterious or immeas-
urable forces acted; these were all. 
These were enough. The energy released in 
atomic explosion is of such magnitude and from 
so concentrated a source that it sets entirely new 
problems in its use or in protection against it. 
Ordinary burning or explosion is a chemical re-
action in which energy is released during the re-
arrangement of the atoms of the explosive ma-
terial. In an atomic reaction, however, the iden-
tity of the atoms, not simply their arrangement, is 
changed. Tb.e_chang~ more fundamental: ~it, 
m~t r is transformed into energy. The energy 
rei eel w 1en a poun o nitr ceri e explodes 
woul-EI,-o m-n~erted into heat, raise the tem-
perature of 150 pounds of water by 18° F . The 
explosion of a pound of uranium would produce 
an equal temperature rise in 2 billion pounds of 
"·ater! Clearly, only a small part of the mass in 
the bomb's active core need be transformed to 
give an explosion of tremendous power. 
At the time of the explosion, then, energy was 
given off in the forms of light, heat, gamma ra-
diation, and pressure. The whole range of racEa-
tions, indeed, seems to have been present. There 
were heat radiations in the low frequency band 
.. 
below infrared, visible waves of all colors (as the 
eyewitness accounts show), and penetrating ra-
diations of very high frequency generally grouped 
as "gamma rays." Light and radiant heat ("flash 
heat") sped out in all directions at a rate of 186,000 
miles per second, and the gamma rays ~1t the same 
rate (though their effect ·was not immediately 
obviou~). The shock waves travelled much more 
slowly. It may be inferred from tests with high 
explosives that the rate at a relative short distance 
from the point of explosion was about 2 miles per 
second, and dropped rapidly to the speed of sound, 
or about one-fifth of a mile per second. Thus the 
light, heat, and gamma radiation reached the tar-
get first, followed by shock and sound and the 
high winds of the blast. 
B. HEAT 
The center of the explosions-several hundred 
feet above ground-was a ball of fire. Because 
the radiant heat given off at the explosion easily 
charred combustible objects while ceasing so 
quickly that surfaces not in the direct line of ra-
diation were unaffected, there are clearly marked 
"shadows'' visible where objects were shielded 
against the heat. By projecting back the sharply 
defined outlines of these shadows, Japanese and 
Allied scientists have determined the height and 
diameter of the fireball. The two fireballs were 
.apparently several hundred feet in diameter. The 
temperature at their core was virtually inconceiv-
able-millions of degrees centigrade. Even at its 
- edge, the temperature was several thousand de-
grees; reasoning from the heat effects observed 
on human beings, bubbled roof tile, and combust-
ible materials, Japanese and Allied scientists have 
placed the figure variously between 3,000° and 
9,000° C. Energy giv~n off in heat alone was es-
timated by Japanese physicists at the rcstronomical 
figure of 1 OJ:l ca 1 ories. 
The flash heat was intense enough to cause fires, 
despite the distrcnce of the fireball from the ground. 
Clothing ignited, though it coulcl be quickly beaten 
out, teleplmne poles charred, thatched roofs of 
houses caught fire. In Hiroshima , the explosion 
started hundreds of fires almost simultrcneously, 
the most distant of which was fo1ind 13,700 feet 
from ground zero; this, however, probably started 
when a building with a thatched roof coll.apsed 
onto a hot charcoal fire. Fires were started di-
rectly by flash heat in such easily ignitible sub-
stances as dark cloth, paper, or dry-rotted wood, 
within about 3,500 feet of ground zero; white-
painted, concrete-faced or cement-stuccoed struc-
tures reflected the heat and did not ignite. A cedar 
bark roof and the top of a dry-rotted wooden plat-
form 5,200 feet west of ground zero, were reported 
to have been ignited by the boni.b flash. The ma-
jority of initial fires in buildings, however, were 
started by secondary sources (kitchen charcoal 
fires, electric short-ci rcuits, industrial process fires, 
etc.). In Nagasaki, both Japanese and American 
fire experts agreed that more fires were caused di-
rectly than indirectly, in a ratio of 60 to 40. The 
range of primary fire there is reported to have 
exceeded 10,000 feet. 
Charred telephone poles were discernible for 
10,000 feet south and 13,000 feet north of ground 
zero at Hiroshima , and for 13,000 feet or more at 
Nagasaki. Bu~ng o~ at Hiro-
shima from g1;ound zero out to 4,000 feet, though 
with only scattered frequency after 2,000 feet. 
The s:inl.e phenomenon was reported at Nagasaki, 
accompanied again by scarring and peeling of 
granitic rocks, almost a mile from ground zero. 
A similar bubbled surface was obtained at the N a-
tiona! Bureau of Standards by heating a sample of 
the tile to 1,800° C. for a period of 4 seconds. The 
effect so produced extended deeper into the tile than 
did the bubbling caused by the atomic bomb, which 
indicates that the explosion of the bomb subjected 
the tile to a temperature of more than 1,800° 
for less than 4 seconds. 
Persons reported feeling heat on their skin as 
far away as 24,000 feet. Burns of unprotected skin 
certainly occurred up to 12,000 to 13,000 feet, and 
reportedly up to 15,000 feet_:_nearly 3 miles. Seri-
ous or third-degree burns were suffered by those 
directly exposed within 4,500 feet, and occasionally 
as remote as 7,200 feet. In the immediate area of 
ground zero, the heat charred corpses beyond 
recognition. 
Clothing as well as buildings afforded consid-
erable protection against the flash. Even a clump 
of grass or tree leaf was, on occasion, adequate. 
The implication clearly is that the duration of 
the flash was less than the time required for the 
grass or leaf to shrivel. While ~n accurate esti-
mate is not possible, the duration could hardly 
have exceeded a fraction of a second. 
C. RADIATION 
From the chain reaction which produced tl1e 
mass release of energy in the explosion, a. wide 
r 
NAGASAKI-Blistered tile found at ground zero. 
''Shadow" of hand valve wheel on paint of a gas holder at Hiroshima. Radiant heat instantly 
burned paint where tbe beat rays were not obstructed. 6,300 feet from grottnd zero 
(japanese pboto). 
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NEW SHOOTS are appearing on this limb of a chestnut tree, 
abottt 2,100 feet south of ground zero at Nagasaki, 2 months 
after the attack, even though the leaves were burned and 
withered at the time of the explosion (Japanese photo). 
TREES SPLINTERED BY BLAST on a Nagasaki hillside, 2,700 feet southwest of ground zero (Japanese 
photo). 
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range of radiations were released. The light and 
heat are familiar elements of explosions, but the 
free neutrons and high-frequency radiations such 
as gamma rays are a new phenomenon. These 
radiations are highly penetrating and lethal. 
The damaging penetration of radiation would 
be possible from three sources: 
(a) From the high-frequency radiations, 
whether neutrons, gamma rays, or other unspeci-
fied rays, released in the chain reaction of the 
bomb. 
(b) From lingering radioactivity from de-
posits of primary fission products scattered in 
the explosion. 
(c) From induced radioactivity in the bombed 
area, caused by interaction of neutrons with matter 
penetrated. 
Only the first cause seems to have had important 
effects, though there are detectable pockets of 
radioaativity in both cities. At Takasu, 10,000 
feet from ground zero at Hiroshima, and at Nishi-
yama, 6,500 feet from ground zero in Nagasaki, 
scientific measurements weeks after the explosion 
showed radioactivity. Presumably this was from 
deposits of primary fission products rather than 
induced radioactivity. In tests of the ground and 
bones of victims of radiation disease, certain sub-
stances-phosphorus, barium,. strontium, rare 
earths-have shown radioactivity. Though evi-
dence of lingering radioactivity is slight, it is 
strong enough to leave .open the ominous possi-
bility of a different situation had the bomb ex-
ploded at ground level. 
The radiation apparently had no lasting effects 
on the soil or vegetation: Seeds later planted 
within a few hundred feet of ground zero grew 
normally. Examination of subsurface soil in the 
immediate area showed presence of earthworms 
and other life only a few inches below the surface. 
The effect on human procreation is as yet unde-
termined, but pregnant women within a mile of 
ground zero showed an increased number of mis-
carriages, and there was in most cases a low sperm 
count among men in the same area. Stories of 
harmful effects on people who came into the area 
n:fter the explosion have been disproved by investi-
gation. 
The rays proved lethal for an average radius 
of 3,000 :feet from ground zero. They caused loss 
of hair up to 7,500 feet and occasionally beyond, 
and other mild effects up to almost 2 miles. 
D. BLAST 
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The pressure or shock wave travelled out in 
all directions from the explosion. The blast ef-
fects produced were uniform, and essentially those 
of conventional larg~ high-explosive weapons 
though on a much larger scale. Thus, iustead of 
localized effects such as the collapse of a roof truss 
or wall panel, entire buildings were crushed or 
distorted as units. 
The blast pressure, as with high explosives, rose 
almost instantaneously to a peak, declined more 
slowly, and then fell below atmospheric pressure 
for a period about three times the period during 
which it was above atmospheric pressure. The 
positive period-that during which the pressure 
was greater than atmospheric->Yas of much 
greater peak pressure than the succeeding, or neg-
ative phase. Short though the positive phase 
was-probably only slightly longer than a sec-
ond-it lasted longer than the positive phase of 
ordinary bombs. Thus the effect of the atomic 
bomb on buildings was usually that of a powerful 
push which shoved buildings over or left them 
leaning, whereas high explosive bombs strike 
sharply and much more briefly and tend to punch 
holes in >valls. The duration was also long 
enough so that almost all building failures came 
during the positive phase. Comparatively few 
evidences were found of failures of members dur-
ing the longer but less intense negative phase; 
window shutters blown outwards toward the ex-
plosion were very rare. 
Experiments with high explosives have shown 
that the face-on peak pressures are approximately 
two to five times as intense as side-on peak pres-
sures; thus greater damage was inflicted on walls 
or roofs facing the blast than on similar surfaces 
parallel to the blast. Near ground zero, the blast 
struck almost vertically downward. Buildings 
were crushed if weak, or the roofs were crushed 
in with little or no damage to the walls. Trunks 
of trees remained standing, but stripped of their 
branches; telephone poles, pushed farther out, also 
remained erect near the center. Many small build-
ings were virtually engulfed in the pressure waYe 
and simultaneously crushed from. different direc-
tions. At somewhat greater distances, both hori-
zontal and vertical components of the blast were 
appreciable, and buildings suffered damage both 
to roofs and to walls facing the explosion. At con-
siderable distances, where the blast was travelling 
BLAST STRUCK DOWNWARD against the roof of the Chinzei School, 1,500 feet from 
ground zero at Nagasaki, which had been taken ov er in part fo r munitions work. 
The fourth story collapsed completely, but the heavy earthquake-resistant structure 
protected some machine tools on the first floor from serious damage. Electric trans-
formers and a switchboard did not escape; a combination of blast, fire, and debris 
destroyed them. 
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in an almost horizontal direction, damage was 
( predominantly inflicted on ·walls during the blast. 
\ In such cases, the buildings were often completely 
racked by the inability o:£ roo:£ truss members to 
transmit the pressure to the :far w·alls. 
( Shielding "·as more important at Nagasaki than 
\ at Hiroshima, because o:£ the hills that divided the 
J city. Building restrictions in Japan after the 1923 
earthquake limited building heights to 100 :feet; 
thus there '>as little shielding by buildings :from 
these airburst bombs. 
Reflection and diffraction effects were observed. 
Had the blast travelled in completely straight 
lines, more buildings would have survived inN aga-
saki than actually did. Reflection effects were most 
clearly observed in the destruction o:£ parapet walls 
o:£ roofs on the side away :from the bomb, where re-
flection o:£ the blast wave :from the roo:£ reinforced 
the blast i11"1pinging on the wall directly. They 
were also visible in the displacing and cracking o:£ 
concrete decks o:£ bridges within 1,000 :feet o:£ 
ground zero, "·here reflection o:£ the blast wave 
:from the " ·ater struck the bridges where their 
resistance " ·as least. 
The resistance o:£ buildings depended very 
largely on their construction, as two examples 
show. 
(a) In the area betwen 2,000 and 3,000 :feet from 
ground zero at Nagasaki, only 9.5 percent o:£ the 
floor a1·ea o:£ reinforced concrete buildings was 
destroyed or structurally damaged. Yet in the 
ring between 4,000 and 5,000 :feet :from ground zero, 
56 percent o:£ such buildings was destroyed or struc-
turally damaged. Careful ~xamination showed 
that the difference lay solBly in design, construction 
detail, and materials: The bomb detonated over 
a section containing the most carefully and 
strongly built buildings in the city, the majority 
multistory earthqu~ke resistant structures. This 
strength more than compensated :for the greater 
intensity o:£ blast. A rapidly diminishing blast 
was capable o:£ seTious damage to ''eaker buildings-
further a'Yay, mostly high, single-story industrial 
buildings, with thin, shell-type, arch roofs. 
(b) At both cities, steel-framed buildings with 
corrugated asbestos walls and roofs suffered less 
structural damage than those with corrugated iron 
or sheet-metal walls and roofs:- The corrugated 
asbestos crumbled easily, permitting the blas.tpres-
sure to equalize itsel:£ rapidly around the main 
:framii1g -meri1bers, but the steel siding transferred 
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the pressure to the structural members, causing 
distortion or general collapse. 
. The limits o:£ blast effects extended 8 miles out, 
"·here some glass reportedly shattered in Hiro-
shima; at the same city, some roo:£ stripping and 
disturbance o:£ tiles was inflicted at the Japan Steel 
Co., 4.1 miles :from ground zero. 
In analyzing the extent o:£ the destruction 
wrought by the bombs, it is necessary to discrimi-
nate between the two cities and bet\Yeen different 
types o:£ buildings. Equivalent effects are :fourtd 
at Nagasaki over greater areas. Structural dam-
age to reinforced concrete buildings, both earth-
quake resistant and nonearthquake resistant, oc-
cmTed "·ithin an area o:£ 0.05 square mile at Hiro-
shima, but at Nagasaki similar severe damage 'ns 
inflicted in an area o:£ 0.43 square mile. 
Severe damage to one-story light steel :frame 
buildings ''as equally extensive at the two cities; 
the area was 3.3 square miles at Nagasaki and 3..± 
square miles at Hiroshima. Heavy steel :frame 
buildings could be studied only at Nagasaki: 
where they suffered structural damage over an 
area o:£ 1.8 square miles. 
One-story brick buildings with load bearing 
walls ''ere severely damaged within an area o:£ 
8.1 square miles at Nagasaki, and within an area 
o:£ 6 square miles at Hiroshima. Multistory brick 
buildings, which were studied only at Hiroshima. 
were severely damaged within an area o:£ 3.6 square 
miles. 
1 \Vood domestic buildings were severely damaged 
within an area o:£ 7.5 square miles at Nagasaki: 
ai1d within an area o:£ 6 square miles at Hiroshima. 
\Vood :frame industrial and commercial buildings: 
which were o:£ inferior construction, were severely 
damaged "·ithin 9.9 square miles at Nagasaki, and 
8.5 squa.re miles at Hiroshima. 
Maximum blast pressures :fall off very rapidly as 
the distance :from the detonation increases. In 
the two bombed cities, thus, reinforced concrete 
buildings o:£ good construction were structurally 
damaged only ''hen within a :few hundred :feet o:£ 
ground zero. Indeed, ground zero itsel:£ was too 
distant :from air zero :for the earthquake-resistant 
buildings to be collapsed. It is the opinion o:£ the · 
Survey's engineers that at Hiroshima more thor-
ough destruction near ground zero, without signifi-
cant loss in the scope o:£ destruction, could haYe 
been achieved had the bomb been detonated at a 
lower altitude. 
I 
FIRE FRINGE. 8,200 feet from ground zero at Nagasaki, the old police station was completely gutted by 
fire. Hills protected homes on tbe right from blast, and fire did not spread to them (Japanese photo). 
BLAST· BUCKLED THE COLUMNS of this wood frame building, beyond the fire fringe 
at Hiroshima (7,600 feet f"t·om ground zero). 
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WRECKAGE IN NAGASAKI STREETCAR TERMINAL 1,500 feet north of ground zero. 
Streetcar in center was blown about 6 feet by the blast (Japanese photo). 
THE HIROSHIMA FIRE DEPARTMENT lost its only aerial ladder truck when the west 
side main fire station was destroyed by blast and fire, 4,000 feet from ground zero (Japa-
nese photo). 
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E. THE ATOMIC BOMB COMPARED WITH 
OTHER WEAPONS 
In comparing the atomic bomb with other 
weapons, it is well to remember the importance of 
the height at which it exploded. Because of this 
distance from the targets, the atomic bombs did 
not exert at any point in Hiroshima or Nagasaki 
the high instantaneous peak pressures of even 
small high explosive bombs. For example, a 
single 100-pound bomb exploding at ground level 
exerts a higher blast pressure over an area of 1,000 
square :feet (for about 18 :feet around its point of 
detonation) than did the atomic bomb at any 
point in either city. 
That fact will place comparisons of the radii of 
effectiveness in the proper perspective. Even at 
the heights from which the atomic bomb was ex-
ploded in Japan, its blast effects were on a ne\v 
scale because the duration of the blast was long 
compared to that of high explosive bombs. To 
take only one example: At Nagasaki, brick build-
ings suffered structural damage within a radius 
averaging 6,000 :feet from ground zero. Compara-
ble damage would be done by a 500-pound high ex-
plosive bomb burst at ground level for a radius of 
55 feet; by a 1,000-pound bomb :for 80 feet; by a 
1-ton bomb :for 110 :feet; and by a 2-ton bomb for 
200 feet. A hypothetical 10-ton blockbuster (only 
10-ton penetrating bombs have actually been used) 
could be expected to achieve equivalent damage 
over a radius of 400 feet. The area of effectiveness 
of the air-burst atomic bomb against brick build-
ings thus ranged from 15,000 times as great as that 
for a 500-pound bomb to 225 times as great as that 
for the imaginary 10-ton blockbuster. 
A simple table shows most strikingly the com-
parison between the striking forces needed for 
atomic and :for conventional raids. Against the 
two atomic attacks can be set the data for the most 
effective single urban attack, that on Tokyo on 9 
Hiroshi-
ma 
Effort and resu)ts 
Nagasaki Tokyo 
Average 
of 93 
urban 
----------I--~ _ __ ___ _ a_tt_ac_k_s 
Planes ___ ______ ---- ----- --- -- - --_ 
Bomb load___ ___ ____ _____________ 1 1 
Population densit y per square 
mile. - -- --- ------- -- ----- --- -_ _ 35, 000 
Square miles destroyed __ .. . _. __ . 4. 7 
Killed and missing ____ _____ __ __ __ 70/80, 000 
Injured .- --- --- -- - -- - - -------- --- 70, 000 
Mortality rate per square mile 
destroyed .____ ______ __ _________ 15, 000 
Casualty rate per square mile.... 32, 000 
1 Atomic. ' Tons. 
279 173 
I 1 ' 1, 667 ' 1, 129 
65,000 130,000 (' ) 
1. 8 15.8 1. 8 
35/40, 000 83, 600 l, 850 
40, 000 102, 000 l , 830 
20, 000 5, 300 1, 000 
43,000 ll,SOO 2,000 
• Unknown. 
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March 1945, and the average effort and results 
from the Twentieth Air Force's campaign against 
Japanese cities : 
vVhat stands out from this compilation, even 
more than the extent of the destruction from a 
single concentrated source, is the unprecedented 
casualty rate from the combination of heat, blast, 
and gamma rays from the chain reaction. 
On the basis of the known destructiveness of 
various bombs computed from the war in Europe 
and the Pacific and from tests, the Survey has es-
timated the striking force that would have been 
necessary to achieve the same destruction at Hiro-
shima and Nagasaki. To cause physical damage 
equivalent to that caused by the atomic bombs, 
approximately 1,300 tons of bombs (one-fourth 
high explosives and three-fourths incendiaries) 
at Hiroshima and 600 tons (three-fourths high 
explosives and one-fourth incendiary) would have 
been required at Nagasaki- in the target area. 
To place that many bombs in the target area, as-
suming daylight attacks under essentially the same 
conditions of weather and enemy opposition that 
prevailed when the atomic bombs were dropped, 
it is estimated that 1,600 tons of bombs \Yould haYe 
had to be dropped at Hiroshima and 900 tons at 
Nagasaki. To these bomb loads would have had 
to be added a number of tons of antipersonnel 
fragmentation bombs to inflict comparable cas-
ualties.. These would add about 500 tons at Hiro-
shima and 300 tons at Nagasaki. The total bomb 
loads would thus be 2,100 tons at Hiroshima ( 400 
HE, 1,200 IB) and 1,200 tons (675 HE, 225 IB) 
at Nagasaki. With each plane carrying 10 tons, 
the attacking force required would have been 210 
B-29s at Hiroshima and 120 B- 29s at Nagasaki. 
It should be kept in mind, however, that the area 
of damage at Nagasaki does not represent the full 
potential effectiveness of the atomic bomb . used 
there. The damage was limited by the small size 
of the rather isolated section of the city over which 
the bomb exploded. Had the target been suffi-
ciently large, with no sections protected by inter-
vening hills, the area of damage would have been 
about five times as large. An equivalent bomb 
load which would correspond to the destructive 
power of the Nagasaki bomb rather than the im-
perfect results achieved would approximate 2,200 
tons of high explosives and incendiaries for physi-
cal damage plus 500 tons o£ fragmentation bombs 
for casualties, a total of 270 B- 29 loads of 10 tons 
each. I 
I ) 
I 
DESTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS WITH BRICK LOAD BEARING WALLS. Note how 
brick debris lies inside wall facing blast, at remains of a barracks at the Japanese Army 
Divisional Grounds, 4,200 feet from ground zero at Hiroshima. The Koa Fire Insurance 
Co. , 1,300 feet from ground zero, is completely destroyed except for the heavy walls of 
the vault. 
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·. 
REINFORCED CONCRETE BUILDINGS STILL STAND-but note how the interiors, as in 
the operating room of the Nagasaki University Hospital (2,200 feet from ground zero), are 
burnt out. Fire has conmmed the floor, the balcony, and all seats, and distorted the metal 
railings and pipe. -
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IV. SIGNPOSTS 
A. THE DANGER 
The Survey's investigators, as they proceeded 
about tJ1eir study, found an insistent question 
framing itself in their minds : "\Vhat if the target 
for the bomb had been an American City~" True, 
the primary mission of the Survey was to ascer-
tain the facts just summarized. But conclusions 
as to the meaning of those facts, for citizens of 
the United States, forced themselves almost in-
escapably on the men who examined thoughtfully 
the remains of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. These 
conclusions have a different sort of validity from 
the measurable and ponderable facts of preceding 
sections, and therefore they are presented sepa-
rately. They are not the least important part of 
this report, however, and they are stated with no 
less conviction. 
No two cities, whether in Japan or the United 
States, are exactly alike. But the differences in 
terrain, layout and zoning, density, and type of 
construction can be allowed for one by one; when 
that is done, comparisons become possible. The 
most striking difference between American and 
Japanese cities is in residential districts: what 
happened to typical Japanese homes is not directly 
applicable to American residential districts. But 
in Japanese cities were many brick and \Yood frame 
buildings of Western or similar design and of good 
workmanship. It ''as the opinion of the Survey's 
engineers, with their professional familiarity with 
American buildings, that these Japanese buildings 
reacted to the bomb much as typical American 
buildings would have. And these buildings were 
exceedingly vulnerable: multi-story brick build-
ings with load-bearing walls were destroyed or 
seriously damaged over an area of 3.6 square miles 
at Hiroshima, while similar one-story brick build-
ings were destroyed or seriously damaged within 
an area of 6 square miles. \Vood frame buildings 
built as industrial or commercial shops suffered 
similar damage in an area of over 8 miles, while 
Japanese residences were destroyed or seriously 
damaged within an area of 6 square miles. This 
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was at Hiroshima, where the less powerful bomb 
was used! 
These figures indicate what would happen to 
typical wood, brick, and stucco structures in Amer-
ican cities. Modern reinforced concrete and steel 
frame buildings would fare better here-as they 
did in Japan. But the following table shows how 
American cities are built, and how few buildings 
are of blast-resistant construction. 
T ypes of structures by exterior material CCnited 
States ci ties) 
City -
Total I structW'es Wood Brick Stucco 
reported 
------------
New York __ _ - · ······ 591,319 236,879 299,482 41,661 
Washington .. 00 00 _ .... 156,359 48,971 95,939 5, 764 
Chicago .. _._. ___ __ . 382,628 131, 148 238, 95g 5, 797 
Detroit .. ..... . ..... 267,677 165, 488 94,333 I. 923 
San Francisco ___ .. 105, 180 61,172 2, 334 40,902 
Source: Sixteenth Census of the United States {1940), vol. II. 
1 Includes blast-resistant buildings. 
Other 
materials I 
----
13, 297 
~~ 685 
6. 724 
5, 933 
722 
The overwhelming bulk of the buildings m 
American cities could not stand up against an 
atomic bomb bursting a mile or a mile and a half 
from them. 
And the people~ We must not too readily dis-
count the casualty rate because of the teeming 
populations of congested Japanese cities. Ameri-
can cities, too, have their crowded slums, and in 
addition tend to build vertically so that the den-
sity of the population is high in a given area 
even though each apartment dweller may have 
more living space than his Japanese equivalent. 
Most of the population densities in this table are 
merely averages for people \Yithin a city limits. 
Most meaningful, therefore, are the figures for the 
central areas of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and for 
the boroughs of New York. The casualty rates 
at Hir<;>shima and Nagasaki, applied to the massed 
inhabitants of Manhattan, Brooklyn, and the 
Bronx, yield a grim conclusion. These casualty 
rates, it must never be forgotten, result from the 
first atomic bombs to be used and from bombs burst 
DAMAGE TO MACHINE TOOLS was mttally indirect. At the Mitsttbishi Steel and Arms 
Works, 4,200 feet from ground zero at Nagasaki, many closely packed machines escaped 
serious damage from collapsing roof trusses, but were exposed to the weather. Other 
machines were torn from thei1· foundations by collapsing steel members. 
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at considerable distances above the ground. Im-
proved bombs, perhaps detonated more effectively, 
may well prove still more deadly. 
City 
Population densities 
United States and 
Japanese cities 
Population Area sq. mi. 
Population 
density per 
sq. mile 
--- - - - --- ---•---
New York ___ ______ __ __ ___ · --- - --- -- 7, 492,000 322.8 23, 200 
Manhattan (day) __ __ __ ___ ___ _____ 3, 200,000 22. 2 145, 000 
Manhattan (night) ______ .. __ .. _ .. 1, 689,000 22.2 76,000 
Bronx_-- - ---- -- __ .. .. ___ .. . _ . ... _ 1, 493,700 41.4 34,000 
Brooklyn ____ ____ ____ ___ . __ ____ __ . 2, 792,600 80.9 34, 200 
Queens ____ ______ ______ . . _. _____ __ 1, 340,500 121.1 11,000 
Staten Island ____ .. __ .. _ .. _ .... ___ 176,200 57.2 3, 000 
Washington. _____ __ ___ -- __ ___ ___ . __ _ . 663,091 61.4 11,000 
Chicago ____________ ____ --.-- --. - . - .. . 3, 396,808 206.7 16,500 
Detroit_ ____ _______ ____ -- ---- -_-- -- - __ 1, 623,452 137.9 11,750 
San Francisco. ____ .. ____ .. _ .. ____ _ .. _ 634, 536 44.6 14, 250 
Hiroshima _____ ___ ____ _______ ___ _ . ___ . I 340, 000 26.5 12,750 
Center of city _________ _____ __ .. _ .. 
'140,000 4. 0 35, 000 
Nagasaki. - -- -- ________ ___ ___ . ___ --- . _ I 250, 000 35 7,000 
Built-up area ___________ . ____ ____ _ 
'220, 000 3. 4 65,000 
1 Prewar. 
• As of 1 Aug. 45. 
Source: New York: Fortune, July 1939-0ther United States cities: Six-
teenth Census of the United States (1940) . 
B. WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 
The danger is real-of that, the Survey's find-
ings leave no doubt. Scattered through those 
findings, at the same time, are the clues to the 
measures that can be taken to cut down potential 
losses of lives and property. These measures 
must be taken or initiated noW', if their cost is not 
to be prohibitive. But if a policy is laid down, 
well in advance of any crisis, it will enable timely 
decentralization of industrial and medical facili-
ties, construction or blueprinting of shelters, and 
preparation for life-saving evacuation programs. 
The almost unprotected, completely surprised 
cities of Japan suffered maximum losses from 
atomic bomb attack. I£ we recognize in advance 
the possible danger and act to forestall it, we 
shall at worst suffer minimum casualties and 
disruption. 
Since modern science can be marshalled for the 
defense as well as the attack, there is reason to 
hope that protective weapons and techniques will 
be improved. Even protective devices and vigi-
lance, however, cannot be perfect guards against 
surprise or initial attack, or against the unlimited 
choices of targets offered an enemy through the 
range and speed of modern weapons. In our plan-
ning for the future, if we are realistic, we will 
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prepare to minimize the destructiveness of such 
attacks, and so organize the economic and admin-
istrative life of the Nation that no single or small 
group of successful attacks can paralyze the na-
tional organism. The foregoing description of 
the effectiveness of the atomic bomb has shown 
clearly that, despite its awesome power, it has 
limits of which wise planning will take prompt 
advantage. 
1. Shelters.-The most instructive fact at N aga-
saki was the survival, even when near ground zero, 
of the fevv hundred people who were properly 
placed in the tunnel shelters. Carefully built 
shelters, though unoccupied, stood up well in both 
cities. Without question, shelters can protect those 
who get to them against anything but a direct hit. 
Adequate warning will assure that a maximum 
number get to shelters. 
Analysis of the protection of survivors withiil a 
few hundred feet of ground zero shows that shield-
ing is possible even against gamma rays. At 
Hiroshima, for example, persons in a concrete 
building 3,600 feet from ground zero showed no 
clinical effects from gamma radiation, but those 
protected only by wooden buildings at a similar 
distance suffered from radiation disease. The 
necessary thickness varies with the substance and 
with the distance from the point of detonation. 
Adequate shelters can be built which will reduce 
substantially the casualties from radiation. 
Men arriving at Hiroshima and Nagasaki have 
been constantly impressed by the shells of rein-
forced concrete buildings still rising above the 
rubble of brick and stone or the ashes of wooden 
buildings. In most cases gutted by fire or stripped 
of partitions and interior trim, these buildings have 
a double lesson for us. They show, first, that it is 
possible without excessive expense to erect build-
ings which will satisfactorily protect their con-
tents at distances of about 2,000 feet or more from 
a bomb of the types so far employed. Construction 
of such buildings would be similar to earthquake 
resistant construction, which California experience 
indicates would cost about 10 percent to 15 percent 
more than conventional construction. Even 
against more powerful bombs or against near 
misses, such construction would diminish damage. 
Second, the internal damage illustrates the danger 
from interior details and construction which re-
sult in fire or flying debris in otherwise sound 
buildings. The elimination of combustible in-
teriors and the provision of full-masonry partition 
HEAVY ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT sttch as this turbogenerator at Minami Sendamachi 
substation 7,700 feet from ground zero at Hiroshima, often survived the explosion. 
NAGASAKI. Steel-framed bttilding about 4,000 feet south of ground zero in Mitsubishi Steel and Arms 
Works distorted to grotesque shape by blast of bomb. 
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NAGASAKI SHELTERS. Ttt?Znel shelter; in the hillside, such as the ones pictured (very 
clos~ to ground zer.o), protected the fe:W occupants from blast, beat, and 1·adiation . 
.. 
HIROSHIMA EARTH-AND-POLE AIR-RAID SHELTER. This simple shelter is undamaged by /ire and blast 
5,000 feet northeast of ground zero, though surrounding buildings have been destroyed (Japanese photo, 10 
Augmt 1945). 
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~-alls. fire-resistive stair and elevator enclosures, 
and fire division walls would localize fires. Avoid-
ance of glass, tile, or lath and plaster on wood stud 
would cut down damage from flying debris. The 
studies of the Physical Damage Division of the 
Suney support such recommendations and in-
clude many others. · 
The survival of sheltered sections of Nagasaki 
suggests forcefully the use that can be made of 
irregular terrain. Uneven ground reduoes the 
spread and uniformity of blast effect. Terrain 
features such as rivers and parks afford natural 
firebreaks and avenues of escape. 
2. Decentralization.-Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
were chosen as targets because of their concentra-
tion of activities and population. The population 
density of 45,000 or more per square mile of built-
up area explains in part the high casualty rate. 
Significant therefore is the fact that deaths at 
Nagasaki, despite the greater population density, 
11ere only one-half those at Hiroshima : the dif-
ference can be assigned in the main to the sep-
aration of the dispersed built-up pockets at N aga-
saki, in contrast to the uniform concentration of 
the inhabitants in the heart of Hiroshima. The 
Nagasaki bomb thus dissipated much of it s energy 
against hills, water, or unoccupied areas, while the 
H iroshima bomb achieved almost optimum effect. 
The fate of industries in both cities again illus-
trates the Yalue of decentralization . . All major 
factories in Hiroshima were on the periphery of 
the city- and escaped serious damage; at Naga-
saki, plants and dockyards at the southern end 
of the city were left intact, but those in the val-
ley where the bomb exploded were seriously dam-
aged. So spread out were the industries in both 
cities that no single bomb could have been sig-
nificantly more effective than the two actually 
dropped. 
:\fedical facilities, crowded into the heart of the 
city 1·ather than evenly spread through it, were 
crippled or wiped out by the explosion. Only the 
prnious removal of some stocks of medical sup-
plies from Hiroshima to outlying communities, and 
the bringing in of aid, enabled the limited medical 
attention of the first few days. 
These results underline those in conventional 
area raids in Germany, where frequently the 
heart of a city 11as devastated while peripheral 
industries continued to produce and where (par -
ticularly in Hamburg) destruction of medical fa-
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cilities just at 'the time of greatest need hampered 
care of wounded. 
The similar peril of American cities and the ex-
tent to which wise zoning has diminished it differ 
from city to city. Though a reshaping and partial 
dispersal of the national centers of adivity are 
drastic and difficult measures, they represent a 
social and military ideal toward 11hich very prac-
tical steps can be taken once the policy has been 
laid down. In the location of plants, administra-
tive headquarters, and hospitals part icularly, the 
value of decentralization is obvious, and can be 
obtained cheaply if the need is foreseen. For 
example, by wise selection of dispersed sites, the 
present hospital building program of the Veterans' 
Administration could be made to lessen our con-
gestion without additional cost. _.,., 
Reserve stocks of critical materials and of such 
products as medical supplies should be kept on 
hand. This principle of maintaining reserves ap-
plies also to the capital equipment of the country. 
Key producing areas must not be served by a single 
source of power or channel of transpor tation. I n-
dispensable materials must not come from proc-
essing plants of barely adequate capacity. Pro-
duction of essential manufactured goods-civilian 
and military- must not be confined to a few or to 
geographically centralized plants. And the vari-
ous regions of the country should be encouraged to 
approach balanced economic development as 
closely as is naturally possible. An enemy view-
ing our national economy must not find bottlenecks 
which use of t he atomic bomb could choke off to 
throttle our productive capacity. 
3. Civilian defense.- Because the scale of dis-
aster would be certain to overwhelm the locality 
in " -hich it occurs, mutual assistance organized on 
a, national level is essential. Such national or-
ganization is by no means inconsistent with de-
centralization; indeed, it will be aided by the 
existence of the maximum number of nearly 
self-sustaining regions whose joint support it 
can coordinate. In addition, highly t rained mo-
bile units skilled in and equipped for fire fight-
ing, r escue work, and clearance and repair should 
be trained for an emergency which disrupts local 
organization and exceeds its capability for control. 
Most important, a national civilian defense or-
ganization can prepare now the plans for neces-
sary steps in case of crisis. Two complementary 
programs which should be worked out in advance 
are thbse for evacuation of unnecessary inhabitants 
THIS STEEL FRAME BUILDING, 2,000 feet from grotmd zero at Hirosbima, had its first-
story colttmns buckle away from the blast, dropping the second story to the ground. 
Combustibles were destroyed by fire. 
COLLAPSE OF REINFORCED CONCRETE BUILDING. Chugoktt Coal Distribution Con-
trol Co., 700 feef'from ground zero at Hiroshima. 
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from threatened urban areas, and for rapid erec-. 
tion of adequate shelters for people who must 
remain. 
4. Active defense.-Protective measures can sub-
stantially reduce the degree of devastation from an 
atomic bomb and the rate of casualties. Yet if the 
possibility of atomic attack on us is accepted, we 
must accept also the fact that no defensive meas-
ures alone can long protect us. At best they can 
minimize our losses and preserve the functioning 
of the national community through initial or con-
tinuing partial attack. Against full and sustained 
attacks they would be ineffectual palliatives. 
As defensive weapons, atomic bombs are useful 
primarily as warnings, as threats of retaliation 
which will restrain a potential aggressor from 
their use as from the use of poison gas or biological 
warfare. The mission of active defense, as of 
passive defense, is thus to prevent the surprise 
use of the atomic bomb from being decisive. A 
wise military establishment will make sure-by 
dispersal, concealment, protection, and constant 
readiness of its forces-that no single blow or 
series of blows from an enemy can cripple its 
ability to strike back in the same way or to repel 
accompanying attacks from other air, ground, or 
sea forces. The measures to enable this unrelax-
ing state of readiness are not new; only their 
urgency is increased. Particularly is this true of 
the intelligence activities on which informed de-
cisions and timely actions depend. 
The need for research is not limited to atomic 
energy itself, but is equally important in propel-
lants, detection devices, and other techniques of 
countering and of delivering atomic weapons. 
Also imperative is the testing of the weapon's 
potentialities under varying conditions. The com-
ing Operation Crossroads, for example, will give 
valuabl(} data for defining more precisely what is 
already known about the atomic bomb's effective-
ness when air-burst; more valuable, however, will 
be tests under new conditions, to provide sure in-
formation about detonations at water level or 
under water, as well as underground. While pre-
diction of effects under differing conditions of 
detonation may have a high degree of probability, 
verified knowledge is a much better basis for mili-
tary planning. 
5. Oonclusion.-One further measure of safety 
must accompany the others. To avoid destruction, 
the surest way is to avoid war. This was the 
Survey's recommendation after viewing the rubble 
of German cities, and it holds equally true whether 
one remembers the ashes of Hiroshima or consid-
ers the vulnerability of American cities. 
Our national policy has consistently had as one 
of its basic principles the maintenance of peace. 
Based on our ideals of justice and of peaceful de-
velopment of our resources, this disinterested pol-
icy has been reinforced by our clear lack of any-
thing to gain from war-even in victory. No more 
forceful arguments for peace and for the inter-
national machinery of peace than the sight of the 
· devastation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have ever 
been devised. As the developer and exploiter of 
this ominous weapon, our nation has a responsi-
bility, which no American should shirk, to lead in 
establishing and implementing the international 
guarantees and controls which will prevent its 
future use. 
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